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Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on
the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law
By CRAIG R. CALLEN*
It is now apparent that the concept of a universally accepted, in-
fallible body of reasoning-the mathematics of 1800 and the pride of
man-is a grand illusion. Uncertainty and doubts concerning the future
of mathematics have replaced the certainties and complacency of the
past.... The present state of mathematics is a mockery of the hitherto
deep-rooted and widely reputed truth and logical perfection of
mathematics.'
If criticisms of the rules of evidence or of the results of controversial
trials have any point, there must be a set of principles against which rules
or trials may be appraised. Unless there are reasonably ascertainable stan-
dards against which one can assess the litigation process, criticism of the
law of evidence or the outcome of trials is only disagreement over mat-
ters of personal preference.2
Scholars in the last two decades, marching under the banner of Bayes'
Theorem,' have argued that the rules of evidence4 and the decisionmak-
* B.A. 1971, University of Iowa; J.D. 1974, Harvard University. Assistant Professor,
Oklahoma City University School of Law. Although a large number of people helped with
this article, the author would especially like to acknowledge the encouragement of the
late Professor Wayne Quinlan, a colleague at Oklahoma City University School of Law.
' M. KLINE, MATHEMATICS 6 (1980).
2See generally Tribe; Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1329-30 (1971).
3 Bayes' Theorem is the mathematical equation in step (11) in note 46 infra. The theorem
itself does not posit that it is adaptable to the trial process. See gecerally Kaye, The Laws
of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34,35-36 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Kaye, Laws]. The expression "Bayesian theory;' or "subjective probability theory," of
the litigation process is used here to refer to attempts to systematize the trial process
or evidence rules so as to employ Bayes' Theorem. Bayesian theorists hold that one can
ascribe a mathematical value to one's estimate of the likelihood of the truth of an inference
based on given evidence and combine these values according to mathematical probability
theory to arrive at an accurate statement of the likelihood that a particular conclusion
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ing of factfinders 5 can and should conform6 to mathematical probability
theory. They argue that a system of factfinding which does not rely on
an articulable standard of accuracy is a system which necessarily treats
similarly situated persons differently without justification. 7
This article will show that the application of Bayes' Theorem as a
mathematical model for evidence rules and for the trial process entails
is true. For a fuller explanation of adaptation of the theorem to factfinding, see notes 20-29
& accompanying text infra.
The exact uses to which advocates of subjective probability wish to put Bayesian theory
vary. One use, advocated by Professor Kaye, is a "modest chart" approach to illustrate
for jurors the effect of use of Bayesian theory as opposed to the presently prevailing "in-
tuitive" methods. Kaye, Laws, supra, at 52. The illustrative chart approach is discussed
more fully at note 52 infra; notes 187-90 & accompanying text infra. A number of commen-
tators, including Professor Kaye, have suggested using Bayesian theory prescriptively,
arguing that legal rules should conform thereto. E.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian
Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Kaye, Probability Theory
Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kaye, Res Ipsa].
Finally, Bayesian theory has been used heuristically as a way of suggesting possible ex-
planations for legal rules and eliminating other explanations. E.g., Kaplan, Decision Theory
and the Fact-finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977). Bayesians have had their critics. E.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser,
Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); Tribe, supra
note 2. These critics mostly have confined themselves to criticizing prescriptive use of
Bayesian formulae. E.g., Tribe, supra note 2, at 1377-78. Some of their criticisms, and many
of those offered here, undercut the rationale for all three uses of Bayesian theory. For
example, the use of subjective probability creates issues of distributive justice. See notes
69-118 & accompanying text infra. Such issues weaken the rationale not only for prescrip-
tive use, but also for the modest chart approach, which is little more than prescription
at the juror's option. The heuristic approach is undercut as well because distributive justice
should be taken into account in rejection or acceptance of explanations of rules and because
explanation and description are frequently indistinguishable. See Kaye, Res Ipsa, supra,
at 1457 n.6.
This article will discuss, for the most part, prescriptive use of Bayesian theory. Because
the modest chart or illustrative approach is prescription at the juror's election, there is
little need to deal with it separately. See note 52 infra; notes 187-90 & accompanying text
infra. The article only briefly discusses heuristic uses of Bayesian theory because the in-
tent of the article is not to deny that Bayesian analysis has heuristic uses, but rather to
point out that such analysis does not take into account other standards against which legal
rules must be measured, including distributive justice, notes 69-87 & accompanying text
infra, and verification values, notes 11, 88-165 & accompanying text infra. Heuristic uses
are discussed at notes 194-210 & accompanying text infra.
' Kaye, Res Ipsa, supra note 3, at 1457.
' E.g., Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove
Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1152-62 (1979) (using chart approach discussed in note
3 supra); Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 3, at 498-517.
' The degree to which conformity is expected varies according to whether the theory
is used prescriptively, illustratively (the chart approach), or heuristically. See note 3 supra.
For the purpose of this article, this difference as to the degree to which conformity is
expected is unimportant because the article is intended to show the respects in which
evidence or factfinding should not conform to Bayesian theory no matter how dogmatic
or flexible its adherents may be.
' Professors Ellman and Kaye appear to concede that deviation from a Bayesian model
in factfinding is proper. ElIman & Kaye, supra note 5, at 1153-54. The principle according
to which these deviations may be made is, however, hard to discern.
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problems not addressed in the legal literature, along with a number of
problems which have been addressed elsewhere. Particular defects in
Bayesian theory include its doubtful psychological assumptions,8 the prob-
lems it poses for the relationship between philosophy of knowledge (or
epistemology) and the law,9 and the distributive justice problems which
certain applications of the theorem will create.10
The argument is not that Bayesian theory is useless as a means of
analyzing the factfinding process, but rather that, contrary to the impres-
sion created by its advocates, Bayesian theory is inadequate as a model
for rules of evidence. This article suggests as a standard of equal, if not
greater, importance in assessing evidence rules, a concept here called
"verification value" 1 which is derivable from a number of rules of evidence,
including the hearsay and character rules. Analysis of the trial process
or rules of evidence in light of the verification value of the information
involved illuminates the relationship among a number of rules of evidence
and alleviates the problems which exclusive reference to Bayes' Theorem
creates.
AN INTRODUCTION TO BAYES' THEOREM
Bayesian theory, also known as subjective probability, is a rigorous,
internally consistent system based on the idea that one can assign a
numerical value to one's inferences and combine those values to achieve
the same kind of results as one would with "objective" probabilities. 2
Subjective probability theory differs from objective probability theory
in that the latter assigns values based on the results of numerous obser-
vations of past events, while subjective probability requires no such
observations. 3
One distinction is important here. The factfinding process, including
the rules of evidence to the extent they are rules of investigation for
the factfinding process,"' is an inductive, not a deductive, process. An ex-
ample of deductive reasoning is:
All killings of wives are committed by their husbands.
The deceased was a wife and was killed.
O See notes 20-29 & 53-68 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 43-51 & accompanying text infra.
,o See notes 69-87 & accompanying text infra.
" For the definition of "verification value," see text accompanying notes 96-99 infra.
12 E.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 136-41.
"See id. at 136-38; Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 42. See generally K. POPPER, THE LOGIC
OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 148-49 (1959).
1, Of course, rules like the interspousal privilege prevent the disclosure of relevant data
to serve certain extrajudicial objectives. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE 92-101 (1947). No authority
or commentator challenges such rules on Bayesian grounds.
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The accused was her husband.
Therefore, the accused killed the deceased.' 5
An inductive analog is:
In most cases of which society is aware, where wives were killed,
their husbands were the killers.
The deceased was killed and a wife.
The accused was her husband.
No reason appears to distinguish this case from most cases.
Therefore, the accused killed the deceased.'"
In deductive reasoning, if the premises (the propositions preceding the
conclusion) are true, the conclusion must be true. In inductive reasoning,
even if the premises are true, the conclusion may be false.' Induction
is the process of making inferences based on evidence which is
inconclusive." In order to understand why subjective probability is not
ideal for induction, that is to say, why subjective probability is not a
system of inductive reasoning which provides the correct result in all
cases,' 9 one first must consider how Bayesian theory works.
Selecting a Probability Value
The first step in applying Bayes' Theorem to factfinding is assignment
of a numerical value to one's degree of belief in an inference which is
based on specific evidence and which states whether a particular conten-
tion is true or false." Unless this assignment process is sound, the
mathematical model for the jury's deliberations has no particular
usefulness. Unless one can say with some confidence, that an inductive
inference from a piece of evidence yields a probability, for example, of
.7 that a particular conclusion is true or false, calculations based on that
numerical value are likely to be pointless.2'
"5 See G. HARMAN, THOUGHT 161-71 (1973).
6 See id.
" One could avoid this problem by identifying relevant distinctions and stating that
none existed in this case, and including the premise that conditions would not change over
time. That would convert the reasoning into deductive reasoning.
" Popper holds that inductive inferences cannot be justified because an attempt to justify
induction depends on induction-the very thing to be justified. K. POPPER, supra note 13,
at 28-30. This article nevertheless uses induction as the process of making inferences from
inconclusive evidence because this appears to be common, if not universally accepted,
philosophical and logical usage, see, e.g., G. HARMAN, supra note 15, at 164-68.
"9 While no one seems prepared to argue this proposition, it must be initially explained
to enable explanation of the remainder of the article. See notes 30-42 & accompanying text
infra.
' As to whether "true" or "false" should be considered the only possible choices, see
note 65 infra. Readers who want to look at a use of the theorem should examine notes
43-47 & accompanying text infra.




Subjective certainty is neither precisely prescribed by the individual
nor entirely under the control of that individual. One might be subjec-
tively certain that God exists, for example, and yet be unable to decide
what corroborative weight various data have in establishing that conclu-
sion. Selecting a numerical equivalent for the likelihood of a given result
from certain evidence requires that subjective certainty, or the maximum
possibility of belief, be considered to be at one end of a scale'-for exam-
ple, that subjective certainty be taken as equivalent to 1.0, that total
disbelief be taken as equivalent to 0, and that the degree to which one
believes an assertion to be true is measured on the scale between 0 and
1.0. Whether a reliable gradation can be anticipated is problematic.
Subjective probability theorists have attempted to solve this grada-
tion problem by positing that the factfinder can select the proper prob-
ability by analogy to betting or odds-making.' This practice is not a real
improvement over unaided selection of gradations. Many people, although
they may have some notion of the chances of drawing one given card
from a pack of 100, have no experience precisely fixing the odds of bet-
ting on more complicated propositions. Requiring factfinders to engage
in a type of activity in which they never before have engaged, or in which
they have engaged only rarely, on the theory that this will "improve"
reasoning in which they have regularly engaged and have had some op-
portunity to test, is dubious.' Moreover, a subjective probability figure,
on a given set of data, is only the factfinder's estimate of the mathematical
probability that a given result will occur. That the factfinder makes an
estimate does not of itself make the estimate useful.'
Suppose the judge instructs a jury, of which J is a member, according
to Bayesian theory. In order for J and the other jurors accurately to assess
The sky is green.
All things which are green are on Mars.
The sky is on Mars.
See, e.g., W. QUINE, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 50-52 (1970).
22 B. RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 396-98 (1948).
' There are several problems with this assumption. First, one is likely to change the
odds one would be willing to fix given what one is risking. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND
THE PROVABLE 91 (1977). Second, to the extent one postulates what is at risk, one might not
assign a risk adequately corresponding to the adverse effect an incorrect verdict would
have on the parties. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1067-69. Third, to the extent one establishes
hypothetical bets or other simulation devices as part of the jury's decisionmaking, one
runs the risk of having the jury take its duty less seriously than is desirable. Cf. Tribe,
supra note 2, at 1375-77 (use of mathematical model for jury decisionmaking may discourage
jury from employing intuition and common values it was designed to provide by making
jury process too mechanical). The most telling exception, the one on empirical grounds,
is discussed in the text accompanying notes 24-29 infra.
?A See I. LEVI, GAMBLING WITH TRUTH 47-49 (1967).
2 Cf. K. POPPER, supra note 13, app., at 387-91 (arguing that degree of corroboration can-
not be identified with probability, a distinction discussed more fully at notes 100-14 & ac-
companying text infra).
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subjective probabilities of whatever class of behaviors is considered the class
comparable to the behavior at issue 28 J and the other jurors would have
to participate in a great deal of empirical testing. For example, if J selects
.75 as the subjective probability of X, and if the "correct result" in this
test case is not-X--that is, that X is not true-Js selection of .75 is not
necessarily an incorrect subjective probability estimate. Instead, the par-
ticular case might be one of the cases included in J's estimate of a .25
probability of not-X. In order to have reasonable confidence as to the
reliability of J's estimate, his accuracy would have to be tested over a
fairly large number of cases.Y
This poses both practical and theoretical problems. The major prac-
tical problem is the increase in time and expense of litigation which results
from such testing or experience. The major theoretical problem is that
of requiring the court to set standards for the tests, and to govern the
jurors' adjustment to the results of those tests. Courts are ill-adapted
to govern this adjustment.' J's nonmathematical inductive ability has been
tested through the duration of his life. By the time of the trial, he has
some idea of the possibility for error contained in one of his inductions.
Given the unlikelihood that J can accurately adapt to the use of
mathematical subjective probabilities, the use of unaided induction seems
preferable.'
' The number and sample structure (given the variations of their positions which the
parties may assert at trial) of such replications would probably be a matter which a trial
judge considered himself unable to resolve. Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise
It: An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 755, 769 (1980).
' Such testing may even be impossible. K. POPPER. supra note 13, at 191; Brilmayer &
Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 136.
' The exact formula and means of correction is a question with which trial judges may
be similarly poorly adapted to deal. Cf. Callen & Kadue, supra note 26, at 769 (discussing
impossibility of judicial control for influence of extrajudicial factors on a number of trials).
See generally Grant, Knowledge, Luck and Charity, 89 MIND 161 (1980). Professor Kaye
makes the somewhat unusual argument that sodium pentothal, polygraphs, and torture
are available after the outcome of a trial to determine whether the jurors' conclusions
are incorrect, so jurors' use of subjective probability theory is not, in principle, unverifiable.
Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 45 n.41, 53 n.60. This is inapposite. Insofar as one means
to include particular jurors in a Bayesian trial, he must have confidence in their use of
Bayesian theory, or at least their ability to play roles the theory requires of them. This
confidence would only be derived by prior experience with them, or with an extremely
broad representative group. Professor Kaye's verifiability suggestions, besides being un-
conscionable, are methodologically crude in that if one acts according to his suggestion,
one may find out whether a criminal is guilty but not know whether the jury used subjec-
tive probability accurately in reaching its verdict, or whether and to what extent the result
deviated from the result of "intuitive" methods.
Some commentators hold that a paucity of particularized evidence supporting a party's
contention that C is true of his opponent should result in a reduction in the subjective
probability that C is true as compared with the probability based on more general evidence.
In other words, these commentators argue that if there is evidence that would lead one
to believe that the probability that C is true of all persons in class S is .51 and if the
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The doubtful worth of fixing values according to Bayesian precepts is
perhaps the least acute problem with the use of subjective probability
to govern induction by factfinders. An example which shows at least one
more acute problem is a hypothetical litigation which will recur in this
article and is referred to here as the blasting cap case.
The Blasting Cap Case
Suppose that the question is whether B was injured by a defective
blasting cap manufactured by company M1 or manufactured by another
manufacturer. All parties concede that the blasting cap was defective.
The evidence shows that the blasting cap was three-pronged and was pro-
duced by the turbo-system process. The evidence further shows that M1
manufactures ninety-five percent of all three-pronged blasting caps
manufactured by the turbo-steam process and the other five percent are
manufactured by M2 , M3, and M4 . Distribution is uniform throughout the
world. Given the explosion of the blasting cap, no further evidence as
to the identity of the manufacturer can be obtained."
party only goes so far as to prove that his opponent is in class S, and offers no explanation
for his lack of more particularized proof that C is true of his opponent, the subjective prob-
ability that C is true of the party's particular opponent is lower than .51. The rationale
for this argument is that the lack of particularized evidence is itself important in deciding
whether C is true of the opponent. Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 107-08 [hereinafter cited as Kaye, Gatecrasher]; Tribe, supra note 2,
at 1346 n.55, 1349-50. This argument is explored more fully in notes 71-87 & 171-82 & ac-
companying text infra. Based on this argument, one could infer that lack of experience
in estimating subjective probabilities should likewise result in an adjustment in the prob-
abilities to account for uncertainty. Bertrand Russell has said of this prospect:
[Certain comparisons suggest] that the uncertainty of data is quantitative, and
can be equal or unequal to the uncertainty derived from a probability inference.
:.. [I]n practice the numerical measurement of the uncertainty of a datum
is seldom possible. We may say that uncertainty is a half when the doubt
is such as to leave an even balance between belief and disbelief. But such
a balance can only be established by introspection, and is incapable of being
confirmed by any sort of test.
B. RUSSELL, supra note 22, at 395. Such an adjustment also presents problems in terms of
the requirement of additivity. See notes 62-66 & accompanying text infra.
I Assume that the only question in B v. M would be whether M1 manufactured the
blasting cap which injured B. This hypothetical is very similar to the blue bus case which
Professor Tribe poses. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1340-41, 1346-50; see text accompanying note
149 infra. This article varies from Tribe's hypothetical because Tribe's discussion of his
hypothetical is directed primarily toward distributive justice and sufficiency of evidence
considerations. The facts were varied to avoid implication of those questions into this part
of the article, which is basically an epistemological discussion. See generally Brilmayer &
Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 120, 130-31. The issues of sufficiency of evidence, distributive
justice, and admissibility which the blasting cap case raises are considered in notes 69-87
& accompanying text infra.
The facts in this problem are reminiscent of Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), which "suggested" application of an industry-wide liabil-
ity theory, on somewhat stronger facts, against blasting cap manufacturers. Sindell v. Ab-
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If induction by factfinders at trial is a process governed by subjective
probability, then in every like case, the jury would be required to find
that M1 manufactured the blasting cap. 1 Given the destruction of the
blasting cap, no inference arises, from B's inability to produce other
evidence, that B is concealing adverse evidence concealment of which
might make B's case an exception to the requirement of an inference of
manufacture by M 1 of the cap in issue from M1 's total proportion of
manufacture of blasting caps." B's lack of additional proof would not en-
tail a lower subjective probability than ninety-five percent and that prob-
ability would require an inference of manufacture by M1 in this and all
similar cases. Yet, M 1 did not manufacture all such caps.' Subjective prob-
ability will not yield a correct result in every case. Therefore, subjective
probability is not a system which invariably provides the only correct
result.
Two points follow from this example. First, given that subjective prob-
ability does not necessarily include checks against an incorrect initial prob-
ability, accuracy in setting the numerical value of a subjective probability
is important.n Second, subjective probability must derive whatever value
it has as a test of the trial process from application across a broad class
of cases." However, application of subjective probability in a class of cases
bott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607-10, 607 P.2d 924, 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141-43
(1980). See especially 26 Cal. 3d at 607 n.22, 607 P.2d at 933 n.22, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142
n.22. Whether such a theory is desirable as a matter of tort law on distributive justice
grounds is discussed later in this article. See notes 80-87 & accompanying text infra. The
only point here is that Bayesian theory is insufficient foundation for such a rule of liability.
31 This assumes that like cases will occur-a plausible assumption when the product
at issue is blasting caps. The probability here is subjective in that one is required to estimate,
inter alia, the probability that M1 manufactured the blasting cap at issue based on the
percentage of all blasting caps which MI manufactured rather than the percentage of all
defective blasting caps which M1 manufactured. See note 33 & accompanying text infra.
' For authorities relying on failure to produce additional evidence as a basis for an
inference adverse to the proponent's case, see, for example, Kaye, Gatecrasher, supra note
29, at 107, 108; Tribe, supra note 2, at 1349-50. Tribe would probably argue for a directed
verdict in this situation. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1361 & n.102. While a directed verdict
may be called for here, it is basically a question of the principle on which liability is to
be founded rather than a question of the application of a Bayesian system. See notes 69-87
& accompanying text infra.
One might ask whether the issue is the percentage of all similarly defective blasting
caps manufactured by M rather than the percentage of all blasting caps manufactured
by M1. See generally Trie, supra note 2, at 1365-66. To ask about all caps discourages
MI's competitors from special quality control measures, as their liability for defects is
minimized by their low market shares (which, ironically, might be due in whole or part
to MI's quality control). See notes 20-29 & accompanying text supra; notes 79-81 & accom-
panying text infra.
See notes 20-29 & accompanying text supra.
This point is important to keep in mind in distinguishing the use of what Professor
* Kaye calls "classical" statistics, Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 51 n.57, from Bayesian theory
in litigation. When an action is claimed to have been taken with regard to a class, applica-
tion of "classical" statistics to determine whether that class shows the effect of such an
action mitigates problems of inaccuracy that individualized use of statistics may create.
[Vol. 57:1
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involves certainty of error in a number of those cases, namely, those in
the statistical minority, and the severe risk of other errors based on
defects in the Bayesian scheme such as fixing of probability estimates.
While subjective probability may not yield the one and only accurate
result, it does not follow that application of subjective probability theory
would not yield the accurate result in more cases than mere adherence
to the rules currently governing factfinding. One may believe, of course,
that those who are generally accurate in their inductions are really using
subjective probability theory, even with its inherent limitations. Five con-
siderations make this implausible.' First, coherent non-Bayesian theories
of induction have been developed, 7 establishing that non-Bayesian induc-
tion is conceivable. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that those who
are generally accurate in their inductions are really using subjective prob-
ability theory. Second, some of the leading "inducers" argue that non-
Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. HI 1979), employment test
which has not been shown to be job-related, although neutral on its face, and which operates
to bar blacks from employment disproportionally as shown by objective statistics, is ac-
tionable racial discrimination), with McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-07
(1973) (Court reasoned that if black applicant is rejected for reemployment because of his
involvement in illegal stall-in to protest alleged racial discrimination and that reason for
rejection is not pretext, even though such refusals to rehire would have disproportionate
impact on blacks, such refusal would not be actionable under Title VII; Court implicitly
refused to rely solely on statistics when individual's conduct was basic issue).
The problem of improper use of probability to show data about individuals rather than
broad classes is similar to the problem of deductive cogency set out in I. LEvi, supra note
24, at 38-41. Assume, for instance, an honest lottery with a million tickets. If one accepts
as true that ticket 1 is going to lose, it follows that he should accept as true that each
of tickets 2 through 1,000,000 also is going to lose. Yet, Levi would argue that if one ac-
cepts individually that each of the million tickets will lose, he must accept the logical result
of the conjunction of all those individual sentences-that no ticket in the lottery will win.
Henry Kyburg argues that one should not require that the conjunction of all the proposi-
tions one accepts as true not be anomalous. Kyburg contends that, after all, each proposi-
tion that an individual ticket will lose is as acceptable as a proposition can be unless it
is deductively entailed. H. KYBURG, PROBABILITY AND THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL BELIEF 196-97
(1961). Levi in turn argues that precisely because the lottery is fair, one should suspend
judgment. I. LEvI. supra note 24, at 40. Granted, no one seriously contends that acceptance
of one result or another as absolutely true is required in any burden of proof test.. One
might well argue that use of probabilistic evidence in the blasting cap case would do relatively
little harm given that M manufactured 95% of all blasting caps of the particular type
involved. An important .objection here is that this may not address the proper class: the
argument should instead be in terms of percentage of defective blasting caps manufac-
tured. See note 33 supra; note 57 infra; notes 69-87 & accompanying text infra.
The question whether Bayesian calculations are more accurate than ordinary "intuitive"
calculations must be answered in terms of plausibility because empirical testing is impossi-
ble. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 136. Although Professor Kaye has attempt-
ed to refute this point, the test he proposes would be both unconscionable and
methodologically flawed. See note 29 supra.
37 E.g., L. COHEN. supra note 23, at 49-244 (example of alternative theory); G. HARM. supra
note 15, at 112-41 (different example of alternative theory).
19821
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mathematical methods of intuition are the key to their inductions.' Third,
in the blasting cap example, the subjective probability is reached without
a consideration of the percentage of defective caps produced by M1 ; the
subjective probability of ninety-five percent is based, perhaps erroneously
on M1 's share of the market; there is no distinction between the percent-
age of defective and nondefective caps produced. 9 Fourth, use of subjec-
tive probability entails errors in all cases which are in the statistical
minority."0 Fifth, if the unconscious Bayesian theory were true, then it
seems likely that reliable inducers would recognize and reproduce the
subjective probability theory mathematics underlying their inductions with
little difficulty. A number of those inducers do not believe that their in-
ductive conclusions are mathematically based." It is not particularly un-
common to find that a person who makes sound generalizations is unable
to engage in Bayesian calculations or calculations of comparable complex-
ity. Therefore, a person may be able to make sound inductive conclusions
without unconsciously using Bayesian theory. It follows that the "un-
conscious mathematics" theorists either are in error or have discovered
a class of idiots savants, including Einstein and Edison,' much larger than
any previously supposed.
The Problem of Dependency
Complex cases would involve difficult testing to determine whether
there is at least apparent conformity to mathematical theory. A
hypothetical illustrates the problem. Suppose two political assassinations
occur simultaneously at point X in a crowded metropolitan area at 1 p.m.
News of the assassinations is broadcast immediately. Assume the crimes
were committed by two different criminals, L and M. All witnesses con-
cur that L killed victim V, and ran to a car of a given make, model, year,
and color, got in, started the car, and was immediately pursued by police
in car 45. The police in car 45 testify that they pursued the car (their
description of the car matches that of the witnesses and extends to decals
in the rear window, the license plate number, and a stuffed animal on
the ledge above the back seat of the car) and that it was in fact L's car.
The officers testify that from the rear the driver of the auto resembled
L. The officers further state that before the driver of the car eluded them,
they chased it going due west from point X for fifteen minutes at speeds
For example, Albert Einstein, quoted in K. POPPER, supra note 13, at 32, and Thomas
Edison, quoted in R. CONOT. A STREAK OF LUCK 142 (1979).
' See note 33 supra.
See note 35 & accompanying text supra; Tribe, supra note 2, at 1349-50.
" Note 40 supra; Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 45.
'4 See note 38 supra.
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exceeding seventy miles per hour. Suppose a jury was asked to assign
a subjective probability of L's guilt based on this testimony.
M walked into his office at 1:20 p.m. Before leaving, he told his secretary
he was going out to see some clients. It is conceded by all parties that
when he arrived in his office, M stated "I killed victim W, he deserved
it, and I'm glad I did it." Suppose a jury on the second case was asked
to assign a subjective probability of Ms guilt based on this evidence.
The problem of dependency may be illustrated as follows: Assume now
that only one homicide was committed, that only one criminal was in-
volved, that only one defendant is being prosecuted, that he is the defen-
dant who supposedly confessed, and that the auto referred to is iden-
tified by the police as the lone defendant's auto. The testimony about
the criminal's flight and the car chase and the testimony about admission
could both be true. If both are true, in order for the (now one and only)
defendant to be guilty, the defendant would have to have driven from
the point where the car chase terminated, at least 17.5 miles west of point
X, to his office in five minutes. Suppose the office is five miles east of
point X. This would mean defendant had driven approximately 270 miles
per hour through a congested metropolitan area for 22.5 miles between
1:15 and 1:20 p.m.43 This would be a highly unlikely occurrence, to say
the least. Thus, if one of the stories is true, the other is quite likely to
be false. If both stories are true, it is likely that someone who resembled
the defendant was driving the defendant's car, and that the defendant
is not guilty. Inferences as to guilt and to the truth of the two stories
are dependent on one another.
In this case, subjective probability theory would require the factfinder
at least in effect to determine the following subjective probabilities in
order to determine the probability that the defendant committed the
assassination: first, the initial subjective probability that the defendant
killed the victim [this probability is symbolized as P(K)];" second, the in-
43 If, as stipulated, the car was going west of point X at speeds exceeding 70 miles per
hour for 15 minutes, to determine the distance the car traveled one would take 15160 times
70 for a result of 17.5 miles. Because the chase terminated at 1:15 p.m. and the defendant
arrived in his office at 1:20 p.m., in order for both stories to be true, and for the defendant
to be guilty, defendant would have to have driven 22.5 miles from the point at which the
chase terminated to his office five miles east of point X. In order to calculate the speed
at which the defendant had to travel one may use the following formula:
22.5 = 5 .Sp,
where 22.5 is the distance hypothetically traveled, 5/60 is the portion of an hour which
was taken up in travel, the symbol "-" means "multiplied by," and Sp is the hypothetical
speed in miles per hour. Without going through all steps of solving the equation, the result
is 270 miles per hour.
" This is the probability that the defendant killed the victim based on unquantified
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itial subjective probability that the defendant did not kill the victim
[P(not-K)]; 5 third, the initial subjective probability that the testimony that
the defendant confessed (the "confession testimony") is true [P(Ad)]; fourth,
the initial subjective probability that the confession testimony is false
[P(not-Ad)]; fifth, the initial subjective probability that the car chase story
is true [P(Cr)]; sixth, the subjective probability that the car chase story
is true if the defendant killed the victim [P(CrIK)-that is, the probabil-
ity that Cr is true if K is true]; seventh, the subjective probability that
the car chase story is true if the defendant did not kill the victim
[P(Crlnot-K)]; eighth, the subjective probability that the confession
testimony is true if the car chase story is true [P(AdICr)]; ninth, the sub-
jective probability that the confession testimony is true if the defendant
killed the victim and the car chase story is true [P(Adj(K & Cr))]; tenth,
the subjective probability that the car chase story is true if the confes-
sion testimony is true [P(CrIAd)]; and eleventh, the subjective probability
that the car chase story is true if the confession testimony is false
[P(Cr not-Ad)].
The formula for the use of Bayes' Theorem, given this evidence, to deter-
mine the probability that defendant killed the victim, controlling for the
dependency among the probabilities is46
data, see Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 139, or at least on a quantification
theoretically independent of other inferences, Tribe, supra note 2, at 1366-68. P(Ad) and
P(Cr), the third and fifth probabilities in the list in the text, are similarly based on unquan-
tified data and are often known as "prior" probabilities. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra
note 3, at 139. The equation in the text is designed to attempt to control for the depen-
dency of each inference symbolized in that equation on the other inferences. Tribe, supra
note 2, at 1367-68.
" P(K) and P(not-K) must equal 1.0 if they are to conform to Bayesian theory, see text
accompanying note 64 infra; note 66 infra, but to calculate P(not-K) simply as 1.0 - P(K)
would be unduly to focus the factflnder's attention on P(K), see note 44 supra; notes 65-66
& accompanying text infra.
" The proof of this formula is based on Tribe, supra note 2. In the statement of the
formula "&" represents joint probability. For example, P(K & Cr & Ad) is the probability
that K & Cr & Ad all are true. The symbol "' means "multiplied by." The proof begins
with two basic postulates, which will be referred to as Formula 1 and Formula 2. Formula
1 and Formula 2 are P(A) = P(A & B) + P(A & not-B) and P(A & B) = P(B) - P(AIB),
respectively. These formulae may be used to prove the following:
(1) P(A & B) = P(B) " P(AIB) Formula 2
(2) P(B & A) = P(A) - P(BIA) Restatement of
Formula 2
(3) P(A & B) = P(B & A) Identity
(4) P(B) P(AIB) = P(A) • P(BIA) Step (3) with substitution
according to steps (1) and
(2)
(5) 1 P(B) P(AIB) = 1 - P(A) • P(BIA) Multiplication by
P(A) A equivalents




P(K & Cr & Ad) = P(AdI(K & Cr))
P(AdICr)
P(CrIK)
[P(K) -P(CrIK ] + [P(not-K) - P(Crlnot-K)]
P(CrIAd)
[P(Ad) - P(CrIAd)] + [P(not-Ad) -P(Crlnot-Ad)]
P(K) - P(Cr) • P(Ad)
(7) P(BIA) = P(B) - P(AIB) Completion of multiplica-
P(A) tion from step (6)
(8) P(A) = P(A & B) + P(A & not-B) Formula 1
(9) P(A & not-B) = P(not-B) • P(Alnot-B) Restatement of
Formula 2
(10) P(A) = [P(B) - P(AIB)] + [P(not-B) - Step (8) with substitution
P(Alnot-B)] according to steps (1)
and (9)
(11) P(BIA) = P(B) P(AIB) Step (7) with substitu-
[P(B) - P(AIB)] + [P(not-B)- P(Ajnot-B)] tion for P(A) according
to step (10)
Step (11) is Bayes' Theorem. The above proof is drawn from Tribe, supra note 2, at 1351-52
& n.72, and lays the ground for the following proof of the formula in the text.
(12) P(KICr) = P(K) P(CrIK) Restatement of formula
I[(K).P(CrIK)] + [P(not-K).P(CrlnotK)] in step (11)
This yields the formula for calculating the probability that the defendant killed the victim
if the car chase story is true. To determine the formula for the probability that the defen-
dant killed the victim if both stories are true, one would do the following:
(13) P(KI(Cr & Ad)) = P(K) P((Cr & Ad)IK) Restatement of
P(Cr & Ad) formula in
step (7)
(14) P(KI(Cr & Ad)) = P(K & Cr & Ad) Step (13) with substitution
P(Cr & Ad) according to Formula 2
(15) P(KI(Cr & Ad)) = P(K & Cr) - P(AdI(K & Cr)) Step (14)
P(Cr & Ad) with substitution accord-
ing to Formula 2
(16) P(KI(Cr & Ad)) _P(Cr) - P(KICr) - P(AdI(K & Cr)) Step (15) with substitutionP(Cr) " P(AdICr) according to Formula 2
(17) P(KI(Cr & Ad)) = P(Adj(K & Cr))" P (KICr) hP(Cr) Commutativity
P(AdICr) P(Cr)
(18) P(KI(Cr & Ad)) = P(Adj(K & Cr)) - P(KICr) Reduction to lowestP(AdjCr) common denominator
(19) P(K Cr) P(Cr IK) P(K) Commutative restatement
[P(K) P(CrIK)] + IP(not-K) P(Crlnot-K)]'of formula in step (12)
(20) P(KI(Cr & Ad)) = P(AdI(K & Cr)) Step (18) with substitution
P(AdICr) for P(KjCr) according to
P(CrIK) P step (19)
[P(K) - P(CrIK)] + [P(not-K) . P(Crlnot-K)]
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This formula and the subjective probability estimates required by it in-
volve a number of extremely subtle interpretations of Bayes' Theorem.4 7
The application of Bayesian theory might even be so complicated as to
be of no practical use. 8
Yet, given that the interpretation of one symbol for an inference in
The formula for P(K & Cr & Ad) is the formula ultimately to be derived here given that
one may rely only on evidence in the record in determining whether the defendant killed
the victim. From Formula 2 it follows that P(K & Cr & Ad) = P(Cr & Ad) - P(KI(Cr &
Ad)). If either P(Cr) or P(Ad) is equal to 1.0, then P(Cr & Ad) would be equal to P(Ad)
or P(Cr), respectively. However, if neither P(Ad) nor P(Cr) is 1.0, then one also must know
the formula for calculating P(Cr & Ad). Professor Tribe avoided this problem by assuming
that his analogs were true. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1367. To determine P(Cr & Ad):(21) P(Cr & Ad) = P(Ad & Cr) Identity
(22) *P(Ad & Cr) = P(Cr) P(Ad[Cr) Restatement of Formula 2
(23) P(Cr & Ad) = P(Cr) P(Ad[Cr) Step (21) with substitution
according to step (22)
(24) P(AdICr) = Restatement of formula
[P(Ad) • P(CrIAd)] + [P(not-Ad)";P(Crnot-Ad)] in step (19)
P(Ad)
(25) P(Cr & Ad) = Step (23) with substitution
P(Cr[Ad) for P(AdICr) according to
[P(Ad) • P(CrAd)] + [P(not-Ad) [P(Crlnot-Ad)] step (24), commutativity
P(Cr) • P(Ad)
(26) P(K & Cr & Ad) = P(KI(Cr & Ad)) - P(Cr & Ad) Restatement of
Formula 2
(27) P(K & Cr & Ad) = P(AdI(K & Cr)) Step (26) with substitution
P(AdICr) according to steps (20) and
(25)
P(CrIK)'
[P(K) - P(Cr[K)] + [P(not-K) - P(Crlnot-K)]
P(K) •
P(CrIAd)
[P(Ad) • P(CrIAd)] + [P(not-Ad) • P(Crlnot-Ad)]
P(Cr) - P(Ad)
The result in the text is obtained by changing the order of P(K) and its immediate suc-
cessor according to the principle of commutativity of multiplication.
'" For example, the probability that the confession testimony is true, given that the
car chase testimony is true, [P(AdICr)], could be quite hard for a layman to distinguish
from the probability that the confession testimony is true if the defendant killed the vic-
tim and the car chase testimony is true. Nevertheless, the distinction is very important.
48 The formula would require, in the case given, on only the evidence necessary for a
prior probability P(K) and the testimony as to the car chase story and the confession story,
11 subjective probability estimates, nine multiplications, three divisions, and two additions,
at least some of which would involve working with some rather small decimal values. Fur-
ther, the court would not only have to interpret the formula itself, but would have to com-
municate that interpretation to the jury. The arithmetical objection might be mitigated
by use of a computer, though this possibly would dehumanize the trial process. Tribe, supra
note 2, at 1375-77.
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subjective probability theory may depend on the interpretation of other
symbols, 9 that every piece of evidence in a trial must tend to "make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence,"' ' and that these inferences about "facts ... of consequence"
would necessarily be related to the ultimate facts in the case and thus
derivatively related to each other, use of these formulae adapted to fit
cases with even more data on which inferences might be made is
unavoidable. Because of the complexity of these formulae in the assassina-
tion example, with relatively few inferences necessary, any attempt to
systematize factfinding in a normal case in a way that is consistent with
the rigors of Bayes' Theorem must be a highly complex and problematical
effort. 1
Two Problems With Prior Probabilities
Two difficulties with the use of Bayes' Theorem by factfinders are
related to basic assumptions needed for the coherence of Bayesian theory.
The first, often called the problem of "prior probabilities," results from
the interpretation of Bayes' Theorem necessary for the theorem's applica-
tion at trial; it requires that at least one probability be established based
on testimony at trial without reference to the sufficiency of evidence on
which to base that judgment 2 or to the soundness of inferences on which
the judgment is based.
" See D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH 102 (1979) (terms [or variables] reinterpreted,
i.e., redefined, to make theorems compatible with other system).
w FED. R. EviD. 401. The quotation of a definition of relevance which includes the word
"probable" should not be taken as a concession that a datum's effect on a subjective prob-
ability estimate is a sufficient condition for the relevance of that datum for evidence pur-
poses. See, e.g., notes 191-93 & accompanying text infra. The point here is that if one takes
the reference to "probable" to include subjective probability, determinations attempting
to control for the dependency of inferences at the very least become extremely complex.
Yet one must test to control for dependency. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1359-61.
5, Of course, should there be no interpretation which avoids a contradiction, or no inter-
pretation which avoids a contradiction and yet is linguistically cogent, an effort at Baye-
sian systematization goes for naught. M. KLINE, supra note 1, at 95.
R" Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 144. Bayesians have argued lack of par-
ticularized evidence should result in a downward adjustment of the estimate of subjective
probability for the inference which that evidence supports, at least when there is not an
adequate explanation for the failure to produce particularized evidence. E.g., Kaye, Res
Ipsa, supra note 3, at 1474-79. See notes 80-87 infra for a discussion of the distributive
justice implications of this view, that is, the issue posed when there is no evidence which
can be produced. For a discussion of the extent to which uncertainty can be accounted
for quantitatively, see note 29 supra; notes 61-66 & 177 & accompanying text infra. This
argument might be taken to imply that prior probabilities should be similarly adjusted
when based on paltry evidence. Yet it appears that advocates of the use of Bayes' Theorem
as a factfinding guide have no response to Brilmayer and Kornhauser's argument that the
principle of indifference, or Laplacean principle of insufficient reason, requires that in the
event the decisionmaker has no information on which of a number of alternatives N is
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Suppose that the only witness to an auto accident (the parties to the
accident are comatose due to injuries caused by the accident) is the
Catholic archbishop. Plaintiffs guardian calls the archbishop to .testify
that the defendant was exceeding the speed limit, that the street was
icy, and that the defendant's car went through two 360-degree skids before
colliding with the plaintiffs car. The archbishop further testifies that the
plaintiffs car was parked in a legal parking place within six inches of
the curb. On cross-examination, much to the chagrin of defendant's counsel,
the archbishop demonstrates that he has 20-10 vision and testifies that
he was a policeman with considerable experience in high-speed driving
and accident investigation before he entered the seminary.
Juror J, who has never driven an automobile, and has considerable dif-
ficulty estimating the speeds of taxis or buses in which he has ridden,
concludes the archbishop's testimony is somewhat unreliable because no
one can estimate the speed of automobiles with complete confidence. J's
estimate of the prior probability of negligence with respect to the speed
of defendant's automobile should be lower than the estimates of those
who considered the archbishop's testimony reliable." J would not, strict-
ly speaking, be dealing with an estimation of the prior probability based
correct, the decisionmaker must assign a subjective probability of 1/N to each. Compare
Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 143, with Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 44.
The other string to the Bayesian bow on the question of the sufficiency of evidence
for prior probability is the chart approach. E.g., Ellman & Kaye, supra note 5, at 1155-58;
Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 3, at 500-05. The chart approach, in the words of Pro-
fessors Ellman and Kaye,
does not ask the jurors [to estimate the numerical prior probability]. It merely
shows them how a correctly ascertained probability would be altered [in light
of other quantified evidence], if one were in fact available. In this way it ac-
curately communicates the significance of the admittedly probabilistic scien-
tific evidence [in example relied on by Professors Ellman and Kaye] without
requiring the evidence to be expressed as a probability.
Id. at 1157 (footnote omitted). This approach ignores the issues in fixing prior probability
values. Although it may not require jurors to make a prior probability estimate, it certain-
ly invites them to do so, possibly with less guidance than a system which requires the.
making of prior probability estimates. It does not address the prime issue-whether a
prior probability estimate gives any substantial basis for decisionmaking. See notes 20-29
& accompanying text supra; notes 187-90 & accompanying text infra. One could argue that
Finkelstein and Fairley's approach is prescriptive in that it allows for no doubt as to the
quantifiability of a prior probability, and just uses the chart to illustrate the correct
mathematical result. Contra, Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 50-52. Finkelstein, in his subse-
quent book, wrote that he would encourage jurors to estimate prior probabilities for use
with the chart. M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 91-94 (1978).
' As to the nature and effect of such a modification, see Brilmayer & Kornhauser, upra
note 3, at 146. Basically, such an adjustment should reduce J's estimate of the subjective
probability that the archbishop's testimony is true without reducing the subjective prob-
ability that it is false. See id. Contrast the discussion in note 65 infra of quantum logic's
recognition of the limits of symbols. To the extent such modifications take place, issues
of insufficiency of evidence are raised. See Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 146.
See generally notes 167-93 & accompanying text infra.
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on the evidence submitted at trial. Rather, if J used his own judgment
in making subjective probability estimates, J would be reaching conclu-
sions based on testimony received at trial and on his own rules of in-
ference; in other words, based on rules of inference derived by J from
his observations outside the courtroom, J would reach conclusions about
the weight of evidence and inferences derived from that evidence.
Jurors are expected to bring their own experience to reasoning about
the truth and falsity of testimony and, more importantly for the'purposes
of this article, to use their experience in determining the degree to which
a piece of evidence entails the truth of one ultimate fact over another.'
Therefore, it is only the desire for rigorous analysis which motivates ex-
ponents of the use of Bayes' Theorem to ask the jury to re-examine the
validity of the rules on which it bases its inferences from testimony to
ultimate facts, and the reliability of the experience on which it bases its
inferences.' Were J provided with appropriate guidelines for this examina-
tion, then presumably J would be able to assess precisely the credibility
of the archbishop's testimony. The point here is not that Bayesian theory
is contrary to the typical practice in judicial instructions. Judges in most
cases refrain from ordering the jury rigorously to re-examine its ex-
perience and the rules of inference derived therefrom," but Bayesian
theory discourages re-examination of those basic assumptions. 7 It may
discourage re-examination of the basis of conclusions which jurors have
drawn from their experience-a re-examination which is implicitly, if not
explicitly, required by the rationale for use of Bayesian theory- and is
a desirable re-examination in which conscientious jurors might otherwise
Otherwise, for example, it would make no sense for the United State's Supreme Court
to require, as it did in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970), that in deciding
whether an issue is required to be tried by a jury under the seventh amendment, the
federal courts should consider inter alia "the practical abilities and limitations of juries."
mSee G. HARMAN, supra note 15, at 189-94 (concluding that remembered data must be con-
sidered to be reinferred for coherent account of inductive inference).
I See, e.g., United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 15 (2d Cir. 1979) (comments in judge's
instructions to jury adverse to witnesses' credibility should be accompanied by statement
that jury could well find otherwise, in whole or in part); United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d
371 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding trial judge's statements that witness was not credible reversible
error; court reasoned that such statements rarely should be made).
67 Professor Tribe refers to this problem as the "dwarfing of soft variables." Tribe, supra
note 2, at 1361-65. There is a marked temptation, once a subjective probability estimate
is quantified, to ignore factors which are less quantifiable (as are the jurors' doubts about
credibility here, see note 53 supra) and rely on the quantified factors. Professors Ellman
& Kaye recognize the problem but argue that the chart approach can account for it. Ellman
& Kaye, supra note 5, at 1156. As pointed out in note 52 supra, the chart invites the forma-
tion of a prior probability by demonstrating the effect of various prior probabilities on
other quantified evidence. It does not even attempt to alleviate the difficulty of estimating
probabilities accurately.
" See notes 43-51 & 55 & accompanying text supra.
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engage. 9 Nor does probability theory provide a point at which the re-
examination process should begin or end.'
An exponent of Bayesian theory might argue that one would naturally
discount the effect of one's own prejudices which are weakly founded by
adjusting the subjective probability to take account of those prejudices."
That is, if J, on the basis of testimony and J's inferences from his ex-
perience, would assign a probability of guilt of .9, then that probability
could be lowered, by J, to account for his prejudices, to, say, .6. The prob-
lem is that, if one is discounting for the uncertain wisdom of relying on
one's own experiences, it is not necessarily true that the probabilities
of guilt and innocence given his experience will equal 1.0. Because J is
not aware of the value of the inference to an unprejudiced juror,"2 J will
not be precise in allowing for that prejudice.' This imprecision could result
in the sum of the probabilities of guilt and innocence being either greater
or less than 1.0. If J's subjective probabilities do not equal 1.0, then the
Bayesian system fails because the sum of the mutually inconsistent and
exhaustive probabilities does not, equal 1.0, which is required under the
"See note 55 supra.
Non-Bayesian analysis admittedly provides no such point. But if a rigorous examina-
tion of one's inferences is a rationale for a factfinding model, then in order to ferret out
the erroneous bases on which inferences might be made, for instance on one's poorly
remembered past experiences, a re-examination of the degree of conditionality of these
inferences is called for. Such a re-examination would be analogous to the conditionality
test in the assassination case, see text accompanying 43 supra. The central difficulty here
is selecting and segregating those inferences to be re-examined. There seems to be no
way short of a study of all the variables which jurors employ in determining cases, coupled
with a thoroughgoing prescription as to how jurors should systematize their prior experience
in light of the tendency to use these variables. Such an attempt might be operationally
impossible and in any event would far exceed, for example, the complexity of Professor
Loftus' work on the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, E. LOFTUs, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
(1979), or Professors Kalven & Zeisel's study of the jury function, H. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). For further background on the difficulty of similar modeling, see
Stroud, Inference, Belief, and Understanding, 89 MIND 179 (1979). The cases on the limits of
the trial judge's authority even to comment on the evidence to the jury strongly imply
that prescription of the way the jurors are to use their prior experience would exceed
the judge's power, at least as currently conceived. E.g., Ah Lou Koa v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 513 F.2d 261, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1975); authorities cited note 56 supra.
', Cf., e.g., Ellman & Kaye, supra note 5, at 1159-61; Kaye, Gatecrasher, supra note 29,
at 106-08 (arguing that one naturally discounts for uncertainty in the case of inadequate
evidence to support an inference). The point seems to have originated with Professor Tribe.
Tribe, supra note 2, at 1349-50.
1 Cf. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 136 n.73 (whether Bayesian methods
are more accurate than "intuitive" methods is untestable in part because of difficulty in
determining whether any verdict is correct). See also the discussion of Kaye's opposing
view in note 29 supra.
" As Bertrand Russell pointed out, the accurate quantification of uncertainty is seldom
possible. B. RusSELL, supra note 22, at 395. Problems of quantifying uncertainty should com-
pound rather than alleviate the difficulty of making any accurate subjective probability




postulates of the Bayesian sytem-that is, it does not follow the princi-
ple of additivity. One could force the subjective probabilities to assume
a semblance of order by merely subtracting the probability of the first
alternative assessed from 1.0 and assigning the result of the subtraction
as the probability of the second alternative. For example, if the probability
of guilt is .7, then the probability of innocence is 1.0 minus .7, or .3. But
this assumes one has only two choices, thereby excluding one's option
to refrain from deciding, 5 and also places most, if not all, of the burden
of uncertainty on the first alternative chosen because the juror will,
through the subtraction, discount the first estimate for uncertainty and
not have a similar opportunity to discount the result of the subtraction."
These problems of additivity7 and of discouraging sufficient rigor in
testing "background conclusions" derived from the juror's own experienceo
are common to all the estimates required for the use of Bayesian theory.
These problems are only discussed at this point because of ease of ex-
planation with probabilities that are nonconditional, for example, P(A),
as opposed to conditional probabilities, for example, P(AIB). An issue which
is equally important in considering the applicability of Bayesian theory
is that of distributive justice. A return to the blasting cap case is
illustrative.
See notes 21-23 & accompanying text supra; note 46 supro. (Formula 1).
0 The decision made here is that the evidence is inadequate for decisionmaking-a con-
clusion for which the legal system provides, but Bayesian theory does not. See note 52
supra; notes 176-77 & accompanying text infra. Gary Zukav has given an example of quan-
tum logic's recognition that eitherior conceptualization of a situation rests on a fallacious
assumption that experience is bound by the same rules as symbols:
During the Lebanese Civil War, a story goes, a visiting American was stop-
ped by a group of masked gunmen. One wrong word could cost him his life.
"Are you Christian or Moslem?" they asked.
"I am a tourist!" he cried.
G. ZUKAV, THE DANCING Wu Li MASTERS 286 (Morrow Quill ed. 1979). Bayesians should be
similarly aware of false dichotomies and of the limits of symbols.
" Professor Kaye argues that the odds-making model for fixing subjective probabilities
in fact produces additive estimates, that is, estimates such that P(A) + P(not-A) = 1. Kaye,
Laws, supra note 3, at 43 n.32. His argument is that an odds-maker who does not establish
additive odds will soon alter his odds so that they are additive. Otherwise, the odds-maker
will always lose money on the bets he accepts. This argument is not sufficient, however.
Jurors who set nonadditive odds would not lose any money, so there would not be an
economic incentive to avoid nonadditivity. While a program to educate jurors might pro-
duce jurors who estimated probabilities in an additive manner, such an educational pro-
gram would have problems of its own. See notes 26-28 & accompanying text supra. Moreover,
Professor Kaye, in this argument ignores what he concedes later in the same article: "[T]he
juror can have the same confidence in the number produced by [Bayes' Theorem] as he
does in the prior probability he estimates:' Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 53. If probability
estimates are to be altered merely to suit the axiom of additivity, without reference to
the accuracy of the resulting estimates, confidence in the resulting estimates is misplaced.
" See notes 61-66 & accompanying text supra.
' See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra.
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Distributive Justice and Subjective Probability
The blasting cap hypothetical discussed earlier69 poses an issue of critical
importance for subjective probability. Briefly, the hypothetical assumes
that B, a boy, is injured by a defective blasting cap of a definite type.
M1, a corporation, manufactures ninety-five percent of all blasting caps
of this type with the remainder spread among three other manufacturers.
Given the explosion of the blasting cap, there is no evidence of the iden-
tity of the manufacturer of the blasting cap. B sues M1 on a theory of
strict liability. The question is whether the evidence that M1 manufac-
tured ninety-five percent of the blasting caps would be a sufficient basis
for a jury's finding that M1 manufactured the blasting cap which injured
B. One way in which scholars have sought to deal with similar problems7'
is to hold that the evidence should be considered insufficient in order
to encourage plaintiffs to seek and present particularized evidence-a
reference to evidence other than statistical evidence." Such a response
is inadequate in a case in which further evidence has literally, and without
any proven blameworthy action on either B's or M1's part, gone up in
smoke.
Relying on M1's percentage of manufacture of all blasting caps as suffi-
cient evidence that M1 manufactured the particular blasting cap which
injured B entails a number of necessary errors in the factfinding process.
The foremost error is that even assuming statistics are truly probative
in individual cases, the most probative statistic is not how many of the
special blasting caps M1 manufactured, but how many or what percent-
age of all the defective special blasting caps M1 manufactured.73 Whether
tht court could accurately determine the percentage of defective blasting
caps as opposed to the percentage of all blasting caps which M1 manufac-
" See notes 30-33 & accompanying text supra.
This portion of the discussion assumes that the courts would allow B's case to go
forward if M 1 only is joined as a defendant. Questions of joint liability and requirements
that other manufacturers be joined are discussed at notes 74-76 & 154-62 & accompanying
text infra.
71 E.g., Kaye, Gatecrasher, supra note 3, at 101; Tribe, supra note 2, at 1340-41.
E.g., Ellman & Kaye, supra note 5, at 1158-61; Kaye, Gatecrasher, supra note 3, at
107-08; Tribe, supra note 2, at 1349.
7 See notes 31 & 33 supra. As Tribe points out, use of subjective probability creates
a risk that the factfinder will confuse the inference from an estimated probability with
a similar but distinguishable inference. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1365-66. Examples include
not only the possible confusion of the percentage of all blasting caps manufactured with
the percentage of manufacture of all defective blasting caps, but also an illustration drawn
from the assassination hypothetical. See notes 43-46 & accompanying text supra. The pro-
bability that defendant murdered the victim is not necessarily equivalent to the probabili-
ty that defendant killed the victim. It may be, for instance, that defendant was insane
at the time of the killing or killed the victim under circumstances constituting manslaughter,




tured depends on the extent to which all manufacturers of this type of
blasting cap are forced to give evidence, the extent to which B is able
to show that all products which could have caused B's injury were
manufactured by the same process, and the ability of B or M1 and the
other manufacturers to prove percentage of defective manufacture. 74
Proof of manufacture of blasting caps with relevant defects to which
the cap that injured B is sufficiently similar could be difficult in that first,
there is the possibility of settlement of claims prior to trial, which would
make ascertainment of defects in those situations difficult;75 second, those
defects which come to an attorney's attention will likely be only those
defects which coincidentally cause injury or loss sufficient for the buyer
to institute an action or to complain to the manufacturer; and third, the
possibility of a product change and uncertainties about the content of
inventories other than the blasting cap manufacturers' make the deter-
mination of the number of defective caps sold and market share of defec-
tive manufacturers extremely difficult. Although the disputes among the
manufacturers pose no particular proof problem for B, the attendant delay
and increased expense in B's lawsuit would give B an incentive to sue
only M1 as a defendant and to oppose the joinder of additional manufac-
turers as defendants.7" The question is whether the law should be willing
to allow B to establish Ml's identity as the manufacturer of the defective
blasting cap which injured B on the basis of M1 's percentage manufac-
ture of all blasting caps.
As indicated earlier, such a willingness would create imprecision to the
extent M1's percentage of marketed blasting caps differs from Ml's
7' Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 594, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980),
which would allow market share to be used to apportion liability among manufacturers
in certain limited situations, is discussed at notes 153-62 infra, primarily because adequate
understanding of the point which that case makes depends on development of the verifica-
tion value model at notes 100-52 & accompanying text infra. It is only important here to
note that SindeU is not based on any notion that mathematical logic provides, a priori
or otherwise, a precise model of the correct result in a given case. 26 Cal. 3d at 612-13,
607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
" Such settlements also would be inadmissible to prove manufacture of a defective
blasting cap. See FED. R. EviD. 408.
"' If the court is willing to adhere to a probabilistic rule of liability when Xs subjective
probability of manufacture of a particular defective blasting cap exceeds .5, then X may
be held liable for all damages proximately caused by that defect and B may be able to
avoid third party joinder of manufacturers other than M. The issue of M1's precise market
share, once M has a sufficient share to be held liable for all damages, is irrelevant to
B. As long as Y1 is able to satisfy a judgment for B, the market shares of M 's competitors
are irrelevant to B. B at least would have an argument, if M, attemptea impleader of
other manufacturers, that such an impleader would unduly complicate B's action. See 6
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 1443 (1971). Even if such an
argument should not prove successful, B could lay his case in a forum in which joinder
is thwarted by the procedural rules of the forum, venue rules, or lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. The same basic question is posed if Ml's competitors at the time of the manufacture
of the defective blasting cap cannot be joined because they are defunct or judgment-proof.
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percentage of marketed defective blasting caps.' Moreover, error is
created over a number of cases to the extent M1's manufacturing percent-
age differs from 100 percent-in this case five percent. 8 MI's percentage
of the blasting cap sales may stem from the quality of M1's product.79
Thus, use of M1 's percentage of manufacture (assuming it is above fifty
percent both of all blasting caps and of defective blasting caps) poses ad-
ditional problems not related to accuracy in B's particular case because
probabilistic logic would require that M1 be held liable in those cases
in which only M1 is a defendant and in all similar cases. This forces M1
to compensate plaintiffs for injuries that it did not cause, which increases
the cost of M1's blasting caps. It is one thing to argue that the tort system
should force M1 to internalize the cost of injuries caused by its product
and pass it on to consumers as a way of both compensating injured par-
ties and increasing economic efficiency,' but it is quite another to argue
that M1 should be forced to compensate all victims and raise its price
to reflect costs which are not associated with its production. In effect
such damages penalize M1 for its large market share, even though the
major reason for M1's market share may well be quality control. 1
Admissibility of market share evidence when only M1 is joined would
create a marked disincentive to the other manufacturers in the market
to maintain quality control. With a product like blasting caps, which are
by their nature likely to leave relatively little evidence behind, if liability
can be placed exclusively on M1 , M1's competitors have little or no incen-
tive to correct product defects; M1 is in effect their insurer. No plaintiff
who had a case for liability against M1 would be likely to bother with
the other manufacturers unless and until there was a problem in collect-
ing a judgment from M1.
A probabilistic rule thus not only would be on poor logical ground, but
also would pose severe problems of distributive justice. "Distributive
justice" here refers to Aristotle's terminology for that kind of justice
[which] is shown in the distribution of honour or money or such other
possessions of the community as can be divided among its members.
... It is admitted on all hands that in distributing shares justice must
take some account of merit. By "merit," however, people do not all
mean the same thing.2
' See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
"' See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., C. HARRIss, THE AMERIdAN ECONoMY 442 (4th ed. 1962). See generally R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW S 9.3, at 203 (2d ed. 1977) (describing competition in quality as
an alternative to price competition); id. S 10.1, at 214 (same).
I See generally R. POSNER, supra note 79, S 6.2. The question whether torts should pro-
vide economic efficiency or loss spreading is not the central issue here. The central issue
is that a Bayesian model can conceal issues that have little to do with the accuracy of
a finding on whether A or not-A is true.
81 See note 79 supra.




The question is not one of mathematical logic but of the principle accord-
ing to which assets and incentives are to be .distributed. In other words,
one must be careful to distinguish questions of the accuracy of a finding
of fact from questions of the precise facts that must be found for liability,
for example, whether a policy of compensation or loss spreading in tort
law requires that M1 is liable in the blasting cap case based only on M 1 's
market share, and from questions of the effects a particular procedural
or evidentiary rule may have on extrajudicial conduct. One may choose
to adopt an economic model" or a noneconomic model" as a guide to
deciding whether to establish incentives' or disincentives with regard
to past and future behavior. It is these choices, whether one wishes to
call them questions of distributive justice or of policy, which dogmatic
application of Bayesian theory conceals.
A fairly common Bayesian argument may be stood on its head to il-
lustrate this point. It is argued that the preponderance of the evidence
test for the burden of persuasion in civil litigation supports the idea that
legal factfinding conforms to a Bayesian model. If one assumes that er-
rors in factfinding have equal disutility whether made in favor of one
party or another, then the argument is that the preponderance test con-
forms to a probabilistic decisionmaking model for maximizing aggregate
utility. 6
3 E.g., R. POSNER, supra note 79. But see, e.g., Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980).
E.g., Exodus 20:1-17.
u For example, the attorney-client privilege excludes otherwise admissible evidence in
order to protect the relationship between a client and his attorney. See C. MCCORMICK.
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 87 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
u See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 3, at 1032-34; Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601,
608 (1980). The most concise mathematical treatment is Note, A Probabilistie Analysis of
the Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. REv. 612, 622 n.31, (1978). By
attempting to maximize utility, Bayesians attempt to minimize the disutility caused by
errors of factfinding over all cases. As long as the assumption that an error for either
side of a dispute has equal disutility holds, this is equivalent to attempting to minimize
errors. Id. The problems posed when there is or seems to be a greater disutility in an
error for one side or another are discussed in notes 87 & 194-210 & accompanying text
infra. Bayesians to date have not argued that the utility of a finding should be balanced
in with the probability that the finding is true to determine whether the finding should
be made. A utilitarian could argue that when U(A) is the utility of A and P(A) is the prob-
ability of (A), a factfinder should find in accordance with A when P(A) • U(A) is greater
than P (not-A) -U(not-A) and find not-A where the latter is greater than the former. Even
when jurors are required to appraise the social utility of conduct, for example, in deciding
whether "reasonable" care has been exercised in a negligence case, e.g., United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947), the question of the social utility of the
conduct is considered discrete from issues of factfinding. Lempert, supra note 3, at 103241.
For the implications of a system which combines estimates of utility and probability, see Fisher,
Truth as a Problem for Utilitarianism, 89 MIND 249 (1980). Robert Bartels argues that the
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases depends on the significance of the punishment
that a conviction would entail. Bartels,Punishment and theBurden ofProof in Criminal Cases,
66 IoWA L.REV. 899 (1981).This argument involves a consideration of the disutilityof conviction




A change in the requirements of proof employed in enforcing a rule
of tort law can cause the utility resulting from enforcement of that rule
to vary from the utility that the rule was intended to secure. Assume,
for example, that product liability is founded only on forcing manufac-
turers to internalize the damages caused by defects in products they
manufacture. If M1 is forced to compensate all plaintiffs comparable to
B in the blasting cap case, whether based on M 1 's share of the market
or on Ml's share of the manufacture of defective blasting caps, the balance
of utility changes. Mf's liability then is based on its size, which naturally
discourages capture of a market. Plaintiffs similarly situated to B become
more financially secure as the law tends to operate as a mechanism for
spreading their losses rather than as a facilitator of choices through the
market. Whether or not such a trend in tort law is desirable, the assump-
tion that use of a Bayesian system as opposed to an ordinary "intuitive"
system is neutral in terms of distributive justice is erroneous.
THE VERIFICATION VALUE STANDARD
An examination of some rules of evidence will show that verification
value is preferable to Bayes' Theorem as a standard for measuring rules
of evidence. Verification value is a concept derived here from those
epistemological schools which hold that knowledge can only be derived
through testing, either formal or informal.' These schools hold that a
proposition is true only to the extent it survives attempts to disprove
" Professor Kaplan noted the problem inherent in an assumption of equal utility of er-
rors in tort law, given the trend to compensation as the model of tort law. Kaplan, supra
note 3, at 1072. Another example of a possible use of Bayesian theory which would alter
a balance of utility is a rule which changes settled expectations which in turn are required
for meaningful planning to occur. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 4-6
(Tent. ed. 1958).
The burden of persuasion in criminal cases is greater than that in civil cases, and it
is not difficult to see this as a result of a perception that an error in conviction is more
grave than an error of acquittal. E.g., Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1073; Lempert, supra note
3, at 1038. This perception should not necessarily be taken as an indication that the reasonable
doubt standard in criminal cases is any more closely correlated with probability than is
the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil cases. To the extent Bayesian methods
increase or decrease the prosecution's ease in obtaining convictions, they vary the balance
of utility from that resulting from "intuitive" methods. The true issue is whether and why
an increase or decrease in convictions is desirable. An additional issue relating to possible
mathematical modeling in criminal cases is whether forcing or encouraging jurors to quan-
tify the meaning of "a reasonable doubt" is permissible under the reasonable doubt stan-
dard. There is a very good argument that it is not. Tribe, supra note 3, at 1372-75. Ad-
vocates of the use of subjective probability could argue that the value of increased ac-
curacy with the use of Bayes' Theorem outweighs whatever changes in the distributivejustice consequences may result. As the claim of increased accuracy is dubious, this argu-
ment is insufficient. See notes 20-68 & accompanying text supra.
I E.g., G. HARMAN. supra note 15; K. POPPER, supra note 13.
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it.9 One defender of this view finds subjective probability theory objec-
tionable on these grounds.' Verification value, as used here, is an adap-
tation of this view to the demands of the trial process. One cannot insist,
or even expect, that all the contentions of the parties at trial as to past
events can be empirically tested. Nor should a court ignore previously
recognized scientific doctrine merely on a party's proof. 1 Bayesians might
object that knowledge is not a necessary outcome of the trial process;
rather, the standard of proof is normally the preponderance of the
evidence.2 Philosophers of knowledge such as Professor Popper do not
take knowledge to require that the proposition which is known is cer-
tainly and eternally true;93 rather, they distinguish tested and testable
theories from subjective judgments."As used here, the "verification value"9 5 of evidence is assessed when
that evidence is submitted to the jury or taken under consideration by
a judge. The verification value of evidence increases as the rigor, quality,
and number of tests which the evidence has withstood increase, whether
those tests were cross-examination or other tests conducted at the trial
or were empirical tests conducted outside of court. Regardless of other
tests, verification value becomes null when evidence is contradicted by
propositions which the court is not prepared to abandon, or allow the
jury to abandon, on a party's proof-that is, judicially noticeable
" See K. POPPER. s pra note 13, at 108. Professor H-arman suggests that "[o]ne may infer
a conclusion only if one also infers that there is no undermining evidence one does not
possess." G. HARMAN, supra note 15, at 151. By placing emphasis on the gathering of evidence
in this manner, Professor Harman in effect requires attempts to disprove in order to gain
knowledge.
90 K. POPPER, supra note 13, at 189-96. Professor Harman, on the other hand, faults a prob-
abilistic rule of acceptance because it does not allow for examination of intermediate con-
clusions. G. HARMAN. supra note 15, at 120-24. Given Harman's heavy reliance on intermediate
inferences as a source of knowledge, see id. at 168-71, there is a close analogy to Popper's
insistence that a hypothesis be falsifiable in order for it to be part of a proper empirical
scientific system. K. POPPER, supra note 13, at 40-41.
" Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 IMl. App. 159, 87 N.E.2d 30 (1949). For fuller discus-
sion of Nicketta, see notes 163-66 & accompanying text infra.
"See generally C. McCoRMICK, supra note 85, S 339.
" K. POPPER. supra note 13, at 111.
" Id. at 44-48. Of course, the idea that theories must be .testable creates some uncer-
tainty, but as Popper points out:
[Tihe fact that the tests cannot go on for ever does not clash with my demand
that every scientific statement must be testable. For I do not demand that
every scientific statement must have infact been tested before it is accepted.
.J only demand that every such statement must be capable of being tested;
or in other words, I refuse to accept the view that there are statements in
science which we have, resignedly, to accept as true because it does not seem
possible, for logical reasons, to test them.
Id. at 47-48 (emphasis in original).
"5 This terminology is derived from logic, which includes the concept of "truth-value."
A three-valued logic has three truth-values, "truth, falsity and something intermediate."
W. QUINE, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 84 (1970).
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propositions." Specifically, when an inference has survived some testing
at trial, a court will not allow that inference to be maintained when it
is contrary to general knowledge" or to "sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." 8 This last standard acts as a means of testing
evidence against sources other than those offered at trial." The emphasis
on testing in the verification value criterion is in marked contrast to the
untested mathematical systematization which Bayesians advocate.
Given that Bayesian analysis has certain flaws, one might wonder if
it nevertheless conforms to the rules of evidence. The distinction between
habit and character evidence, namely that evidence of a habit to prove
conduct is admissible, 10 while evidence of character to prove conduct 0 '
is generally inadmissible,'0 2 shows evidence law effectively minimizing the
E.g., FED. R. EviD. 201.
FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
98 Id.
" Appellate courts as well as trial courts may take judicial notice of facts when ap-
propriate. E.g., 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 201106] (1981).
1 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 406.
191 This does not refer to habitual criminal statutes which make a certain sort of character
itself a crime. Nor does it refer to a situation in which one's perception of character is
important, for example, when the victim's reputation for violent behavior is relevant to
prove defendant's justification in acting in self-defense. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(2).
102 E.g., FED. R. EvID. 404. This general principle is not without exceptions, which might
at first glance seem to defeat the argument that the character-habit distinction requires
that the variables on which the judgment as to the trait is based are controlled for and
that the trait has appeared in every situation with appropriate characteristics in order
for evidence of the trait to be admissible. On further examination, this argument survives.
For example, the exception for crimes which show a common modus operandi could be
read as allowing a showing that, because the defendant committed a crime on occasions
A, B, and C, he should be found guilty of committing a like crime on occasion D. Yet the
requirement of empirical support is rigorous. People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 245-49, 444
P.2d 91, 98-102, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 426-30 (1968), teaches that the common characteristics
must be distinctive rather than characteristics of a number of armed robberies, and that
the presence of marked dissimilarities is also a factor to be considered. A court is required
to consider whether each of the alleged common characteristics is sufficiently distinctive
that when combined together they show that only the defendant could have committed
the crime. The exception is an inverse-habit (that is, not something that the defendant
has done innumerable times, but rather something that others rarely do), or as McCormick
puts it, "like a signature." C. MCCORMICK, smpra note 85, S 190, at 449. Another exception
to this rule cited by McCormick is admissibility of evidence of conduct showing a predisposi-
tion to commit certain unnatural sex crimes. The cases cited are less than adequate to
show this proposition. Three cases are cited admitting evidence of incest or statutory rape
committed with one daughter as evidence of the same crime committed with another. State
v. Edwards, 244 N.C. 527, 31 S.E.2d 516 (1944); State v. Jackson, 82 Ohio App. 318, 81
N.E.2d 546 (1948); London v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 190, 140 P.2d 242 (1943). The episodes
offered are by definition closely related to the crime alleged. There is little if any distinc-
tion between the evidence offered in these cases and a typical modus operandi case. In-
deed, McCormick cites no cases which do not either have such common characteristics or
rely on a common plan or design among the episodes offered in evidence and the events
alleged to have taken place. McCormick cites one case based on the idea that all unnatural
sex acts have a common design or are similarly motivated. Commonwealth v. Kline, 361
Pa. 434, 62 A.2d 348 (1949). Other courts have adhered to similar principles. E.g., Gregg,
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distributive justice and epistemological problems which Bayesian analysis
raises. The difference between character and habit is the repeated and
consistent practice of the habit as opposed to the occasional practice which
is called character."3 This distinction is closely analogous to the distinc-
tion Professor Popper has drawn between probability and degree of con-
firmation or corroboration."' He sees subjective probability as distinct
from the degree of confirmation because subjective probabilities cannot
be verified by testing."5 According to this view, confirmation is furnished
Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Of-
fenses, 6 ARMz. L. REv. 212,221-31 (1965). Such holdings pose a severe problem for a character-
habit dichotomy, in that the cases rely on a predisposition per se. Given that they seem
to view all unnatural sex crimes as similar and that the rule shows no sign of invasion
into other areas, the rule can be considered a warping of the modus operandi or common
plan rules to fit a highly emotional situation. Id. at 234-35. When it is kept in mind that
most jurisdictions still at least formally require that the past unnatural act has been com-
mitted with the same person, the admissibility of sex-crime-propensity evidence in certain
jurisdictions can be seen as merely anomalous. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 220-21 (1977).
Professors Lempert and Saltzburg argue that evidentiary rules, of which the rule generally
excluding character evidence is an example, which appear to exclude relevant evidence,
exclude evidence which is seldom probative. Id. at 181-246; Lempert, supra note 3, at 1031.
Professor Lempert notes that, even when such evidence would appear relevant to a con-
tention, it is in circumstances in which much more.specific evidence about facts in issue
is normally available and should be used. If such more specific evidence is not offered,
the factfinder should find against the contention. Id. at 1031 n.35, 1049. This analysis does
not seem premised on any probabilistic theory of evidence. Thus, it is a laudable attempt
to alter a Bayesian model (which Lempert presents elsewhere in the cited works) to cor-
rect for some shortcoming of probability theory. It has a defect, however, in that it does
not explicitly grapple with the situation in which the lack of more particularized evidence
is adequately explained-a distributive justice problem. See notes 71-87 & accompanying
text supra; notes 171-82 & accompanying text infra.
Professor Lempert also attempts to square the "relevance rules," as he refers to those
rules exemplified by article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence, with Bayesian theory
in another manner. He argues that rules excluding evidence which would be excluded as
"prejudicial" under the ordinary evidence lexicon are justified according to the Bayesian
model because of problems in estimating the probability value of such evidence. Lempert,
supra note 3, at 1027-30. According to his argument, other evidence is excluded by the
relevance rules because so little is known about the relationship between the evidence
and the parties' contentions that estimation is similarly difficult. Id. at 1029. To the extent
Professor Lempert wishes to use this argument for more than showing that Bayesian theory
is roughly analogous to evidence law, it fails. Quantification of subjective probabilities is
so unreliable in and of itself that the application of subjective probability theory at trial
is unworkable. See notes 20-29 & accompanying text supra. Accordingly, marginal changes
in regard to some quantifications will do little good. There may also be a problem with
Lempert's argument in that the theory of indifference could be read as requiring a subjec-
tive probability estimate even though no relevant evidence has been adduced. See note
52 supra.
1 Compare 1 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE S 92 (3d ed. 1940) with id. S 65. As an illustration,
under new codes patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence, character may be proven
by use of specific instances of conduct. FED. R. EvID. 405(b). See also Kuhns, The Propensity
to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777 (1981).
10 K. POPPER. supra note 13, at 387 app.
105 See id. at 387-89. Professor Popper also argues that both sorts of probability are not
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only by testing the accuracy of a hypothesis by experience."' Further-
more, "a hypothesis may be very probable simply because it tells us nothing,
or very little. A high degree of probability is therefore not an indication
of [the acceptability of a hypothesis]- it may be merely a symptom of
low informative content.
1 7
An illustration of the difference between probability and corroboration
is an observation of an intersection in a residential neighborhood. If the
observation were conducted from 1 a.m. to 2 a.m. on Monday and the
only car observed were a green Lamborghini, one would be required to
conclude, on a strictly probabilistic rule of acceptance, that the only
vehicles which ever passed through that intersection were green Lam-
borghinis. Therein lies the distinction between high probability with low
informative content and corroboration -the fact that no one would be
inclined to accept the result of so limited a test as conclusive.
In the case of character evidence, the evidence is basically an induction"'
made by the witness based on a number of experiences with or recollec-
tions about the subject of the testimony. Some of these experiences or
recollections may be inconsistent with the characteristic which the
evidence is offered to prove.0 9 Habit evidence differs from character
evidence in that the former is evidence of the "invariability" of the sub-
ject's conduct through a number of situations identical in all material
respects to the situation at issue. ° Thus, the requirements for the ad-
missibility of habit evidence parallel Popper's theory of corroboration 1
equivalent to corroboration in that they do not state the "'degree to which a statement
z is supported by a statement y.'" Id. at 391.
See id. at 399.
10 Id. (emphasis in original).
100 See notes 14-18 & accompanying text supra.
E.g., Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1971) ("'Character' is a general-
ized description of one's disposition in respect to a general trait such as honesty, temperance
or carefulness"; court held habit, on the other hand, to exist where deceased "showed a
regular practice at meeting 'a particular situation with a specified type of conduct").
"I Baldridge v. Matthews, 378 Pa. 566, 106 A.2d 809 (1954). Concededly, courts may have
trouble deciding whether a practice is a habit or merely a part of the subject's character.
For instance, the number of repetitions of the situation could have been sufficiently few,
the set of circumstances could be too imprecisely described, or the court could decide that
the supposed "habit" is too much like the subject's normal conduct to be isolated as a
habit. See generally J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 977-80 (6th ed. 1973). Although the distinction is fuzzy at the edges,
the courts still accept it. FED. R. EviD. 404, 406; Lewan, The Rationale of Habit Evidence, 16
SYRACUSE L. REV. 39, 49-51 (1964) (arguing that extent of repetition should be admissible to
check abuses of overstated testimony, but not on probabilistic rationale). "Invariable regular-
ity" is Wigmore's standard. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 103, S 92, at 520. The federal rules
merely use the word "habit" for persons and "routine practice" for organizations. FED.
R. EVID. 406. The text at note 116 infra qualifies the objective probability analogous to habit
evidence as near 1.0. This qualification is only because it is doubtful that one's conduct
on every similar occasion can be proven in every case.
"' See notes 104-07 & accompanying text supra.
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in requiring that the habit be examined against a standard and in the
degree to which the survival of the hypothesis depends upon how many
times the practice has been repeated. Although requirements of the trial
process are somewhat different from those of the laboratory, the concept
of verification value as used herein is the general equivalent of Popper's
notion of corroboration for evidence law, differing only in acknowledging
first, that certainty in evidence or conclusions cannot be expected; and
second, that the court does not have time to re-examine any generally
accepted or verifiable theory which a party might wish to question.1 1 2 The
requirements for admissibility of habit evidence control for verification
value by forcing proponents of such evidence to show invariable repeti-
tion and to explain behaviors inconsistent with the proponent's conten-
tion. This process reduces the problems of distributive justice1 13 and
epistemology which broad-scale admissibility of character evidence would
present."'
The distinction between objective and subjective probabilities is not
identical to the habit-character distinction. Character testimony involves
more observation, specific or general, than a subjective probability
estimate would require.1 Objective probability statements will normally
result in a probability of much less than the near 1.0 which habit evidence
requires. Yet, objective probability and habit evidence do differ markedly
from subjective probability and character. The difference is one of kind
rather than degree. Habit evidence and objective probability"7 both re-
"i As to testing against prevailing scientific theories, see notes 131-36 & accompanying
text infra.
1 The problem here is one of distributive justice insofar as admissibility of character
evidence may either cause X to be convicted or liable, when Y is the culpable party, or
discourage X from rehabilitation. See notes 82-87 & accompanying text supra.
" A severe example of the effect of admissibility of character evidence is the use of
prior episodes of unchaste behavior by an alleged victim in a rape case to show increased
likelihood of the victim's consent. See Letwin, "Unchaste Character", Ideology, and the Califor-
nia Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 35, 42, 52 (1980). An assumption that because
a woman consented to intercourse with a particular man in a particular set of circumstances,
she would be more likely to consent to intercourse with any man under any circumstances
(which a general rule of admissibility would assume), is a classic example of assumption
of a pattern of conduct in a situation in which the sample is grossly inadequate. While
one might argue that admissibility of prior unchastity does not affect distributive justice
in that it results in a decreased number of convictions of the innocent, the argument would
ignore the fact that such a rule deters prosecution and tends to avoid conviction of the
guilty. Given that the probative value of prior unchastity in a rape case is generally minimal
and the difference in prosecution and ability to evade conviction is much greater, the balance
is heavily in favor of inadmissibility. The epistemological problems referred to are dis-
cussed at notes 115-21 & accompanying text infra.
"' Bayesian theory does not require observations establishing the accuracy of one's sub-
jective probablity estimates prior to their application. See, e.g., Kaye, Laws, supra note
3, at 43 & n.32; note 52 & accompanying text supra.
116 See note 110 & accompanying text supra.
11 See generally K. POPPER, supra note 13, at 212.
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quire an accounting for, and induction from, every instance, although that
accounting may be erroneous.11 Subjective probability and character
evidence require only an induction based on a portion of the total evidence,
including a number of possible observations, on which an induction could
be made.119 When a subjective probability estimate is made, one's facility
for making the estimate, given the difficulties in testing the accuracy of
one's estimates and the possible problems with their conformance to the
requirement of Bayes' Theorem, is an extremely slender basis for infer-
ring anything with confidence.1 Similarly, if character evidence were ad-
missible to prove conforming conduct, one might properly testify that
a subject has a given character even though a number of the witness'
observations have been to the contrary or the witness has observed the
subject too few times to testify that the subject has a habit. 2' The verifica-
tion value of character evidence of jurors' estimates of subjective prob-
abilities is slight.
The two main areas in which character evidence is admissible to prove
conduct are evidence of the character of defendant to raise a reasonable
doubt of guilt" and evidence of a witness' bad character for purposes
of impeaching the witness." In its case-in-chief, the prosecution in a
criminal case generally is prohibited from using character evidence to
prove conduct.lu The purpose of the rule is to prevent confusion of issues,
unfair surprise, and undue prejudice. 2 ' The defendant in a criminal case
,18 Kaye, Laws, supra note 3, at 53. Admittedly, an error or a number of errors of obser-
vation may be included in the events recorded in determining an objective probability.
However, the number of observations on which objective probability figures are normally
based tends to limit the effect of any one error by providing numerous opportunities to
balance or discover it.
119 As to character, see notes 100-03 & 108-09 & accompanying text supra. As to subjec-
tive probability, see note 52 supra.
" See notes 20-87 & accompanying text supra.
121 As an example, Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639, 642-43 (Tex. 1965), holds that two
prior convictions of driving while intoxicated are not sufficient to establish frequent or
habitual drunkenness such as would be admissible to impeach the defendant on the issue
of drunkenness or to show that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the relevant
accident, even when there was other evidence of intoxication. Two convictions of driving
while intoxicated, especially if well publicized, however, could become a part of the defen-
dant's reputation or of a witness' perception of that reputation. Testimony of reputation
is admissible when evidence of character is admissible. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
E.g., Edington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361 (1896).
12 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 608.
12' The prosecution nevertheless might be able to introduce evidence of past crimes com-
mitted by the defendant. For example, when the prior crime is an element of the crime
charged, as under a habitual criminal statute, evidence of the prior crime is admissible.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 n.8 (1948), and authorities there cited. For
other instances in which evidence of past crimes is admissible, see C. McCoRMIcK, supra
note 85, § 190, at 447-54.
"2' Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). For a fuller discussion of the
concept of prejudice, see notes 195-210 & accompanying text infra.
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may introduce evidence as to his character, not because it is particularly
probative of his conduct, but because of a policy concomitant with the
reasonable doubt standard favoring the admission of evidence which might
tend to exculpate. '26 Admissibility of evidence of a witness' character for
purposes of impeachment is based on a slightly different analysis. Although
relatively trivial in value,m evidence as to the witness' character for truth
and veracity is admissible to test the witness' testimony as part of the
process of determining the verification value of the testimony. The
credibility of testimony rests on the jury's assessment of the witness'
qualities such as moral character.1" The habit-character distinction thus
supports verification value as an important objective in evidence law.
Verification Value, Judicial Notice, and the Hearsay Rule
The concept of judicial notice and the hearsay rule pose potential prob-
lems for the verification value theory. At first blush, the practice of judicial
notice of adjudicative facts1" might be seen as a major flaw in the argu-
ment that maximizing verification value is an important standard in for-
mulation of rules of evidence. One might see the taking of notice of a
matter, after which it is deemed concluded, 3 ' as showing that evidence
law does not necessarily have verification value restraints. The Federal
Rules of Evidence, however, refer to noticeable facts as not being "sub-
ject to reasonable dispute" and to sources "whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." '
12 E.g., G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 38, at 109 (1978); C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 85, S 190, at 456; cf. 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
441-42 (1883) (discussing dignity and apparent humanity of criminal trial and avoidance
of appearance of harshness as reasons for rule against self-incrimination). Use of this
testimony does allow the prosecution to prove or attempt to prove the defendant's bad
character, which could prejudice the jury, producing a tendency to convict because the
defendant is "bad," rather than on the evidence in the particular case. See Note, Procedural
Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 426, 440-42, 450 (1964). Yet such evidence is admitted only as an "equally illogical"
counterweight to the good character defense. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
478-79 (1948). Indeed, it is hard to see how else the prosecution could hope to refute the
defense.
I" 3A J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE S 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
128 Id. S 874. Wigmore, in this passage, even uses impeachment as the antithesis of "cor-
roboration." Compare the discussion in notes 104-06 & accompanying text supra.
129 E.g., FED. R. EvED. 201.
Lw E.g., FED. R. EvID. 201(g) (as to civil cases only). A contrasting approach is advocated
by Wigmore. 9A J. WIGMORE, supra note 103, 5 2567(a). Wigmore would allow dispute of a
judicially noticed matter by a party who believes the issue to be disputable. Given, however,
that FED. R. Evm. 201(e) allows for a hearing on the taking of judicial notice and that even
under Wigmore's system the party opposing judicial notice would be subject to a directed
verdict if it failed to refute the "noticed" matter, the practical difference between the posi-
tions is at best slender.
"I FED. R. Evm. 201. "Indisputability" is often used as a word of art to refer to the character
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The facts of Nicketta v. National Tea Co.t32 provide a basis for illustra-
tion of the distinction between judicially noticeable data and absolutely
certain data. The Nicketta court held that the trial court was justified
in dismissing plaintiff's complaint of breach of an implied warranty of
fitness of pork after proper cooking. The complaint alleged that the plain-
tiffs contracted trichinosis from pork that was properly cooked." Both
courts took judicial notice of the proposition that one cannot contract
trichinosis from pork which is properly cooked.
If one gives the theory of natural selection any credence at all, it seems
entirely possible that trichinae might evolve which are much less heat-
sensitive than their forebears. By way of analogy, viruses and insects
which are much less sensitive to certain antibiotics or chemicals have
already developed. The Nicketta court noted that scientific "facts" are
not immutable.34 The pivot on which Nicketta turns is not impossibility
of dispute about the possible causes of trichinosis but, rather, general
acceptance by scientists that trichinosis can only be contracted by eating
pork which has lacked proper cooking or any refrigeration. When this
reasoning is coupled with the fact that on summary judgment the plain-
tiffs' only contention to the contrary was that trichinosis could result from
pork that was merely cooked, '35 judicial notice may be seen as a test of
the verification value of the evidence of the party opposing judicial notice
against then-accepted scientific theories.
The rule against hearsay,3" in its design to increase cross-examination
of judicially noticeable facts. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 201
[03] (1980). The term is not meant to imply that certainty is required. Rather, the test
is whether the matter is "beyond practical dispute." Id. at 201-31 (emphasis added). As
Morgan, perhaps the strongest proponent of the "indisputable" school, conceded: "the judge
and the parties may often reasonably be in doubt as to whether the matter is disputable;
and whether the proposition involved is disputable may be the subject of dispute among
reasonable men." 1 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 9 (1961).
" 338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N.E.2d 30 (1949).
" Id. at 160, 87 N.E.2d at 30.
134 Id. at 162-63, 87 N.E.2d at 31.
13 Id. at 164-65, 87 N.E.2d at 32.
Ill The hearsay rule has, of course, been under attack. E.g., Weinstein, Probative Force
of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331 (1961); Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1786 (1980). The criticism of the rule is either based on the idea that juries
are perfectly capable of appreciating the possible defects in hearsay testimony, id. at 1792;
see, e.g., Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARv. L. REV. 932, 939 (1962), or that the rule and its ex-
ceptions are too woodenly contrived for their purpose, see, e.g., Note, supra, at 1787-93.
As to the first point, given the breadth of the exceptions to the rule, that evidence which
is in fact excluded by the hearsay rule is excluded as a control over the jury's discretion.
The point is that evidence which is so unreliable that it cannot come within any exception
to the hearsay rule is not an adequate basis for a finding of fact by any juror, despite
his discernment. Thus conceived, the rule is analogous to a directed verdict standard. Cf.
Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Ap-
proach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 325 (1980) (arguing that functionally
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of out-of-court statements,' acts to increase verification value of evidence
presented to the jury by securing testing of statements which could not
otherwise be effectively tested. Verification value is increased by forcing
the party offering the statement either to put the declarant on the stand
or to forgo the evidence.
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are somewhat less easy to reconcile
with a verification value maximization objective. The reliability of some
evidence receivable under the exceptions seems extremely questionable.
One might question whether evidence received under the spontaneous
exclamation, or excited utterance, exception"M is very reliable."9 There
* may be special doubts as to the requirement that the declarant be under
stress when the statement is made. Similar doubts arise about the re-
quirement that a statement admissible under the present sense impres-
sion exception4 be made during or immediately following the declarant's
perception of the event or condition described in the statement, at least
when the event is stressful or exciting. It is well accepted in the
psychological literature that stress may well have an adverse effect on
the accuracy of a witness' perception."' Psychological research indicates
that jurors are not particularly good at controlling for this problem,
especially when the situation at issue was a violent one."' Given these
difficulties, one might ask whether there is any basis to assume that spon-
taneous utterance or present sense impression evidence is more reliable
than evidence untested against any standard.
The psychological theory on which the spontaneous exclamation rule
was originally founded is that stress and excitement prevent the declarant
from exercising his faculties to distort the truth to serve his own
similar evidentiary devices should be subject to a similar constitutional standard). As far
as this author is aware, no critic of the hearsay rule on this ground has ever shown a
single specific instance when otherwise inadmissible hearsay would, absent the hearsay
rule, be sufficient to support a verdict. The arguments that the existing rules are too wooden,
or that a balancing test should be employed, are not particularly relevant to this article,
assuming that verification value as well as probability is a criterion in determining the
admissibility of the evidence. Two observations seem in order. First, as rules would un-
doubtedly develop over time as to the application of a balancing standard, and the existing
exceptions to the hearsay themselves have developed through a balancing process, marginal
changes in the exceptions would seem less wasteful in the long run. Second, the mode
of balancing which the note cited above advocated, namely, quantifying the reliability of
evidence, is highly questionable. See notes 20-29 & accompanying text supra.
"I See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL.EVIDENCE, BY EDMUND
M. MORGAN 227 (5th ed. 1976).
E.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(2).
1 Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 CoLUM. L. REV.
432 (1928).
140 E.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
'"-See E. LOFTus, supra note 60, at 33-36, 151-56.
'" Id. at 173-75.
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self-interest. " ' This "mentalist"'"4 psychological theory, even if an
anachronism now, was generally accepted by the courts at the turn of
the century.4 Continuation of rules allowing admission of statements made
under stress is not due to uncritical acceptance of evidence offered at
trial, but to reluctance to reexamine hoary legal rules,'4 8 even though the
rules are based on notions of refuted, or at least highly doubtful, scien-
tific principle. The question is not whether particular exceptions to the
hearsay rule undercut a verification value maximization policy because
the exceptions were originally adopted on then-contemporary theories of
psychological or physical reliability. The question is whether there is any
reason for the continuance of these exceptions.
Verification Value and Distributive Justice
One other possible problem with verification value analysis remains,
namely, whether and to what extent adherence to a maximum verifica-
tion value criterion increases or decreases distributive justice problems. " 7
Careful adherence to a maximal verification value standard mitigates prob-
lems of distributive justice in two ways. In combination with an absence
of probabilistic analysis, it forces the use and maximum discovery " 8 of
particularized evidence and encourages the testing of that evidence to
the maximum extent feasible. Particularization avoids the problem of
severe prejudice which may arise, for instance, in Professor Tribe's blue
bus hypothetical in which an alleged victim testifies she was run over
by a blue bus and offers to show that X Bus Company operates ninety
percent of the blue buses operating on that street."' There is a great
likelihood that such evidence would prejudice the jury in her favor on
the questions of the reliability of the alleged victim's testimony.',, The
more particularized the plaintiffs proof, the less likely there is to be a
" Compare 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 127, § 1747 with W. JAMES, PSYCHOLOGY: THE BRIEFER
COURSE 60-62 (G. Allport ed. 1961).
14 Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 139, at 435.
14 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 162g. (16th ed. Wigmore ed.
1899) and cases there cited.
14 See generally B. CARDOZO, Growth of the Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS 173 M. Hall ed.
1947). Curiously enough, the present sense impression exception came about in part as
a reaction to the idea, which was strongly pressed by Wigmore, that shock or excitement
is a guarantor of veracity. See also Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the
Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IowA L. REV. 869, 875-76, 897 (1981).
"I See notes 73-87 & accompanying text supra (discussion of distributive justice issues
which subjective probability poses).
1" One of Professor Tribe's major complaints is that use of probabilistic evidence would
tend to discourage full use of discovery procedures. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1349-50.
19 Id. at 1340-41, 1346-47.
"s This is referred to by Professor Tribe as the "dwarfing of soft variables." Id. at 1361-65;
see note 57 supra. See also notes 194-210 infra (discussion of prejudice).
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broad gauge error in determining the facts in a particular case.
The major contribution of maximizing verification value is to present
distributive justice issues clearly by avoiding probabilistic clouding of the
issue. The real issue in terms of effective adjudication in the blasting
cap case"' is not whether the blasting cap which injured the plaintiff was
manufactured by one defendant or another because the manufacturer of
the specific blasting cap which caused the injury is unascertainable. The
important point is whether, and by what means, the plaintiff shall have
compensation, assuming that the blasting cap was defective. The court
is faced with the decision whether to assess damages to the class of
manufacturers to which the defendant belongs and on what basis. 5' Sub-
jective probability has nothing particularly to do with the problem. Once
the rule upon which liability is to be determined has been established,
then statistics play a role.
An illustration of a rule which does allow reliance on probabilistic
evidence, but as a supplement to a rule of compensation, rather than on
a theory that it is required by mathematical logic, is that of Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories." Under Sindell, a plaintiff who was injured by the
administration of a specific drug, DES, to her mother during pregnancy,
but who cannot identify the manufacturer of that drug through no fault
of her own, may nevertheless recover against all makers of that specific
drug who used an identical formula and who sold the drug in the ap-
propriate market.' The plaintiff must join defendants who have manufac-
tured a substantial percentage of the product marketed.'55 The individual
manufacturers have the burden of proving that they could not have made
the particular dosage or dosages which injured the plaintiff.'- Liability
"4 Notes 30-33 & 69-81 & accompanying text supra.
"' See Hall v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 370-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
"4 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
" Id. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. Note there were no conten-
tions of difference in quality control procedures. See 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court appears to hold that joined defendants can avail themselves
of third party joinder or, if they are held liable, seek contribution from other manufac-
turers. Id There is some question whether other states would be willing to recognize the
Sindef theory. E.g., id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing); Ferringo v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 569-70, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314 (1980).
What is important for purposes of this article is not whether other states are prepared
to accept a theory such as Sindell. There are instead two points: first, that Sindell faces
the true issue-whether there shall be compensation even though evidence as to the precise
tortfeasor is lacking-,decides that issue, and then apportions damage in terms of the only
arguably sound mathematical application available, by apportioning damages according to
shares of the proper class (manufacture of DES according to an identical formula rather
than all manufacture of DES); and second, if the courts are unwilling to accept probabilistic
methods in a case like SindeU, there would be little reason to suppose that Bayesian analysis
would be acceptable.




is determined by the proportion that each defendant's share of the ap-
propriate market bears to the aggregate shares of the appropriate market
of all joined defendants.'57
The Sindell court's analysis is an improvement upon Bayesian analysis
in numerous respects. Sindell makes explicit the problems of compensa-
tion, deterrence of product defects, and the lack of other available evidence
as the prime determinants in the choice of a probabilistic scheme." The
case does not purport to base its use of probability on ineluctable dic-
tates of logic."9 The court itself points out that each defendant's share
of the liability in DES cases over time will only be "approximately
equivalent to the damages caused by the DES it manufactured."''
Damages are spread across those who used identical formulae to manufac-
ture the drug at the time the mother purchased the prescription. This
assures that the market figures are percentages of the proper class.'"
Liability is shared among the manufacturers rather than placed upon one
solely because of that manufacturer's share of the market." In short, prob-
ability is used in the Sindell case as the logical servant of a principle
of law, rather than being used on the theory that a priori principles dic-
tate its use. Once probabilistic tools are understood properly, many, if
not all, of the distributive justice problems which attend probabilistic
proof" ' can be addressed directly rather than allowed to continue on the
unstated and erroneous assumptions that reliance on Bayesian methods
minimizes "errors""' and maximizes aggregate utility."1
5
1.7 Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court recognized the prob-
lems in defining the market and determining market share. Id. Cf. 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 518, 520, 522b, 524 (1978) (discussing analogous problems in defin-
ing markets and estimating market share in antitrust law).
26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
, But see authorities cited note 3 supra, other than those using Bayesian theory
heuristically.
,"8 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
... See notes 33, 79 & 81 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 76-82 & accompanying text supra.
18 See notes 82-87 & accompanying text supra.
18 Id. To put the point a slightly different way, one can only meaningfully say an error
has taken place in comparison to a rule of law. When the enforcement mechanism substan-
tially alters the rule of law, the enforcement mechanism cannot be said to be minimizing
errors in enforcing that rule of law.
18 Id. On the error minimization-utility maximization distinction, see Fisher, Truth as
a Problem for Utilitarianism, 89 MIND 249,255 (1980). Another example of a verification value
rule is the best evidence rule, which requires the original of a writing, recording, or
photograph to prove the contents thereof, unless failure to produce the original is satisfac-
torily explained. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 1001-1004. The rule applies even though a copy which
has no known errors, but which was not examined against the original to see whether
it was an exact copy, is available, so long as the original is available. FED. R. EviD. 1002,
1004. A probabilistic rule would allow the document to be received in evidence if it were
a close copy, but not known to be exact. See generally notes 30-33 & accompanying text supra.
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SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY,
AND THE DIRECTED VERDICT TEST
A dictum in Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co." has proven to be
a thorn in the side of those who favor the use of subjective probability
analysis in evidence law. ' In Sargent, Judge Lummus stated:
It has been held not enough that mathematically the chances somewhat
favor a proposition to be proved .... The weight or preponderance
of evidence is its power to convince the tribunal which has the deter-
mination of the fact, of the actual truth of the proposition to be proved.
After the evidence has been weighed, that proposition is proved by
a preponderance of the evidence if it is made to appear more likely
or probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from
the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstand-
ing any doubts that may still linger there.'
This formulation of the preponderance test makes a perception of the
standard based on mathematical notions of probability difficult. The
Sargent test also appears not to square very well with one of the black
letter formulations of the preponderance test, that is, whether "the ex-
istence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence.""6 9
Moreover, one can infer from the arguments of several commentators'7°
that the reasoning in Sargent should not preclude subjective probability
analysis. Those commentators show that the Sargent standard is not as
inconsistent with Bayesian analysis as one might suppose. At least one
commentator has suggested that it may be superficially consistent with
maximizing expected utility.-'7 These commentators argue that one would
naturally discount a mathematical probability standing alone when there
1" 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940). The question in Sargent was whether plaintiff
had sustained his burden of proving that the insured had met his death by accident in
showing that the insured embarked on a kayak trip in Northern Canada in September
without winter clothing under circumstances discussed in the case which indicate the in-
sured lost his kayak and drowned. No quantified evidence was offered in Sargent, nor was
any use of subjective probability considered.
167 E.g., M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 59-73; Kaye, supra note 86, at 603-11.
"' 307 Mass. at 250, 29 N.E.2d at 827.
,6' C. McCoRMICK, supra note 85, S 339, at 794; accord, F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE S 7.11, at 277 (2d ed. 1977).
17 E.g., Tribe, supra note 2, at 1341 n.37, 1349-50 (discussing Smith v. Rapid Transit,
Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945) (relying on Sargent)); Kaye, supra note 86, at 610-11.
Professors Ellman and Kaye make an argument, basically identical to the one discussed
in the text, without discussing Sargent or any other case. Ellman & Kaye, supra note 5,
at 1158-61. Professor Finkelstein argues that Sargent should be assessed on the basis of
"equalization of errors." M. FINKELSTEIN. supra note 60, at 69. Because Kaye has effectively
refuted Finkelstein's argument, and adopted the argument in the text based on some of
Finkelstein's own premises, the text only addresses Kaye's argument. See Kaye, supra note
86, at 605-11.
171 Kaye, supra note 86, at 608. For a general discussion of the utility maximization argu-
ment, see notes 86-87 & accompanying text supra.
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was no adequate explanation of a failure to produce more particularized
evidence." If in a paternity trial, for instance, the plaintiff showed that
seventy percent of all defendants in paternity cases were held liable, and
offered no other evidence, the factfinder would be justified in presuming
that the defendant in the particular paternity case was not the father
as alleged. If the defendant was in fact the father so much particularized
evidence would normally be available that the plaintiff's unexplained
failure to adduce such evidence should be taken as strongly persuasive
in favor of the defendant. 173
A second point is that treating a subjective probability based on
statistical evidence without particularized proof as insufficient evidence
eliminates any incentive to the plaintiff to rely only on statistics. The
removal of such an incentive avoids the type of result in the blasting
cap case,17 in which M1 would have to pay for all damages from defective
blasting caps manufactured by a particular process whenever M1 manufac-
tured in excess of half of such blasting caps.7 5
Relying on these arguments, one can argue that the sufficiency of the
evidence test is a standard which minimizes errors along Bayesian lines,
promotes the maximum use of particularized proof, and thus reduces in-
accuracy. The reduction in inaccuracy results in an increase of expected
aggregate utility.'
This twofold argument falls a bit short. An unexplained failure to pro-
duce particularized evidence should result in some discounting of what
would otherwise be the estimate of the subjective probability; however,
quantifying uncertainty is so problematic171 that it is questionable, when
an estimate, before discounting, is well above .5, say .8, that discounting
for uncertainty will result in a subjective probability below .5.
While the second argument 78 takes some account of the distributive
justice problems use of subjective probability may pose,79 it falls short
of a solution. To the extent particularized nonmathematical evidence is
relied on, it necessarily avoids the specific problems of distributive justice
which subjective probability poses." There are, however, two questions
" Ellman & Kaye, supra. note 5, at 1159-60; Kaye, Gatecrasher, supra note 29, at 106,
108; Tribe, supra note 2, at 1339 n.33, 1349; Kaye, supra note 86, at 603.
1 The problem is taken from some discussion in Ellman & Kaye, supra note 5, at 1149-52.
The adverse inference from nonproduction of particularized evidence is discussed in
authorities cited note 172 supra.
See notes 30-33 & 69-81 & accompanying text supra.
1 Tribe, supra note 2, at 1349-50; Kaye, supra note 86, at 603-11. For a discussion of
the distributive justice implications, see notes 76-87 & accompanying text supra.
17' This is what Kaye appears to argue. Kaye, supra note 86, at 605. See also note 86
& accompanying text supra.
177 See notes 29 & 61-66 & accompanying text supra.
.7. See note 175 & accompanying text supra.




the second argument leaves: first, the test to be applied when there is
no particularized evidence which can be submitted, 1" and second, if par-
ticularized evidence is submitted, whether probabilistic alternatives should
also be admissible.
This article has discussed the first issue above." The issue of whether
to allow generalized subjective probabilistic evidence is not one relating
to the accuracy of factfinding. Instead, it is an issue of the principle or
principles on which rewards and punishments or assets and liabilities are
to be meted out; it is an issue of distributive justice. Until this question
is resolved, Bayesian theory has no usefulness.
The issue of admissibility when particularized evidence is available is
similar. Bayesian theory is useful only if subjective probability estimates
are made as to the truth of all material inferences based on the evidence.
Quantification of particularized evidence is one of the flaws in Bayesian
analysis."M Accordingly, courts should take care to use quantified evidence
only when either the statistic itself is the subject" or, for reasons relating
to the underlying substantive rule, the court is willing to accept a statistic
as an approximation in that particular case. Bayesian formulae should
not be used even as illustrations of the possible effect of quantified
evidence. This would apply equally to a chart with "prior"'81 probability
estimates based on evidence which had previously been unquantified. For
example, the effect of particular "prior" probabilities in conjunction with
objective probabilities such as the frequency of a blood trait in the popula-
tion should not be used.' Such an approach would only be useful if sub-
jective probability, or a probability derived on both objective and subjec-
tive data, is equivalent to probative force.' Such a chart approach is pro-
ductive only of confusion."
" Or when a failure to do so has been adequately explained.
18 See notes 69-87 & accompanying text supra.
' See notes 187-90 & accompanying text infra (discussion of so-called chart approach).
18 See notes 20-29 & accompanying text supra.
1 See, e.g., note 35 supra.
18 See notes 87-160 supra. See also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 157, S 507, at
330 (pointing out that all methods of defining market for antitrust purposes "raise difficult
problems of proof and judgment"); Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 121 (discuss-
ing usefulness of "summary statistics").
' See notes 3 & 52 supra; note 190 infra.
,' For a fuller exposition of this chart approach, see Ellman & Kaye, supra note 5, at
1152-58.
"' Professors Ellman and Kaye appear to believe the two are equivalent. Id. at 1157.
1 Professors Ellman and Kaye misstep at least once more in their argument for the
chart approach. They argue:
[The modified chart approach] does not ask the jurors to produce [a subjective
probability estimate based on unquantified data]. It merely shows them how
a correctly ascertained probability would be altered, if one were in fact
available. In this way it accurately communicates the significance of the ad-
mittedly probabilistic scientific evidence, without requiring the remaining
evidence to be expressed as a probability.
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Given all these arguments, one still might ask what the word "prob-
able" in the black letter "more probable than not" standard means.191 By
in effect requiring particularized evidence in the case before it, the Sargent
court apparently decided that in order to meet the "more probable than
not" standard, the party bearing the burden of proof must provide
evidence which is persuasive enough that it has an acceptable verifica-
tion value192 derived from either in-court testing or extrajudicial ex-
perience, regardless of whether an application of mathematical probabil-
ity theory would yield a probability of greater than .5 for the truth of
the proposition at issue.'93 A factor other than mathematical probability
must be considered in deciding the degree to which data affect "probabil-
ity" in evidence terms.
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY IN MODELING
Although subjective probability theory is faulty as a device for prescrib-
ing factfinding or procedural rules, it does not follow that it is otherwise
Id. at 1157 (footnote deleted). Even assuming that a combination of subjective and objec-
tive probabilities has significance, Ellman and Kaye ignore another issue. Their modified
chart approach invites jurors to make a subjective probability estimate; otherwise the chart
is basically meaningless. That is, it tells the jurors that if they can do X, Y will result.
It is doubtful, at best, that jurors can do X (formulate useful subjective probability estimates).
Moreover, it is the trial court's duty to decide whether the jury would be justified in draw-
ing certain inferences, for instance, in deciding whether or not to direct a verdict. See,
e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933). Accordingly, Ellman and Kaye's
example would be closely analogous to a court instructing a jury that while the court did
not know how to decide whether the jury was justified in drawing a specific inference
from specific evidence, if such an inference could be properly drawn, then the jury would
be justified in reaching a certain conclusion. On its face, that would be a paradigmatic
abdication of judicial responsibility. On the whole, Eliman and Kaye's chart approach comes
perilously close to begging the question whether a subjective probability can ever be reliable.
', See note 169 & accompanying text supra. There is no reason, in view of the weaknesses
in mathematical subjective probability theory and the lack of identity between Bayesian
theory and probative force, to interpret the word "probable" for the purpose of deciding
the relevance of evidence any differently from its meaning in the burden-of-proof test as
interpreted in this article. See generally FED. R. EVID. 401: "'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
this evidence." See also note 50 & accompanying text supra.
19 See notes 95-146 & accompanying text supra.
19 See note 168 & accompanying text supra. A contention that "probable" or "probabil-
ity" used in ordinary conversation is indistinguishable from mathematical notions of "prob-
ability" is implausible. Neither WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1806 (1976)
nor THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2309-10 (1971) defines "pro-
bable" in terms of mathematics. The Oxford Dictionary does use two mathematical illustra-
tions and both refer to the use of the term "probability" in mathematics. Id. Neither pur-
ports to confine the meaning of either of these words to the mathematical context. The
point here is not that the use of the word "probable" does not imply that mathematical
analogies may have some usefulness, but rather that "probable" and "probability" in evidence
law are not delimited by mathematical notions. Cf. G. HARMAN, supra note 15, at 97-100
(discussing use of one's beliefs in perceiving the definition of words).
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useless. It can help illustrate certain kinds of problems. One commen-
tator's discussion of prejudicial evidence is illustrative.19 ' He argues that
jurors may regret a decision for party P rather than party Q when that
decision is either erroneous or contrary to their sympathy for Q or lack
of sympathy for P.19
5
Two examples will illustrate this argument. First, consider the ques-
tion of the admissibility of the possession of liability insurance to show
negligence." Set aside the question whether the fact that defendant owned
such insurance tends to show that defendant was negligent. Even if the
evidence tended to show negligence, it should be inadmissible, according
to this argument, because it alters the jury's regret matrix. Such evidence
Would make the jury regret an error in the defendant's favor more than
an error in the plaintiff's favor. An error in the plaintiff's favor would
seem to impose less hardship, as defendant would have insurance to cover
the loss. 1 7 In terms of utility, errors in plaintiff's favor would seem to
cause less disutility than errors in defendant's favor. Once the balance
of disutility between errors in favor of the plaintiff and errors in favor
of the defendant is altered, a Bayesian trial model develops a serious
flaw. '98 Therefore, by analogizing the trial process to Bayesian theory,
the commentator argues the evidence should be excluded.'"
Another use of regret analysis relates to criminal cases. Suppose there
are two defendants, D1 and D2, each accused of committing armed rob-
bery, but not the same armed robbery. Suppose further that other crimes
were admissible to show that a defendant acted in conformity with
whatever character was shown in those crimes.' If D1 had a prior criminal
record, or engaged in illegal acts of which he had not been convicted, °
and D2 had no such past, a juror would be more likely to regret erroneous-
ly convicting D2 than erroneously convicting D 1 . Regardless of the pro-
bative force of the past record, a juror might regret conviction of D1
less because the marginal stigma of the last of a series of convictions
would do less harm to D 1 than an initial conviction would do to D2 and
because the juror may perceive D1 as likely to have committed or to com-
mit other crimes and thus as a fit subject for punishment."3 This change
'' Lempert, supra note 3, at 1032-40.Id. at 1032-34. While Lempert uses quantified charts, they are not necessary to the
discussion here.
I' Id. at 1038.
197 Id.
198 See notes 86-87 & accompanying text supra.
19 See Lempert, supra note 3, at 1041.
' Id. at 1039-40. This example is altered slightly from Professor Lempert's version.
, That is, suppose that FED. R. EviD. 404(b) were abolished.
The change in "regret" may be especially marked in the case of unpunished criminal




in the juror's perceived regrets means, in Bayesian analysis, that the
burden of proof varies in the prosecutions of D1 and D2 . It means that
the jurors will be more willing to convict D1 than D2 , if one conceives
of the burden of proof test as a rule to maximize aggregate utility. The
argument is that because application of a different standard of proof to
D1 than to D2 is improper, prior crime evidence should be excluded.'
The analogy between the rules excluding evidence because it is con-
sidered "prejudicial" and shifts in regret matrices unrelated to the facts
in issue is a useful one, especially for students who have. trouble
distinguishing between logical and legal relevancy. Because a rigorous
explanation of Bayesian theory and its defects is hardly necessary to ex-
plain this point, the analysis is not only an improvement in precision over
conclusory statements about prejudice, but a practical improvement as
well.20
There does seem to be a kind of utility or regret of which the regret
analysis does not take account. This is what might be called "macro-
disutility," the disutility with regard to society in general of a change
in the evidence rules, rather than with regard to the result in a particular
case."6 Suppose a rule were adopted allowing proof of W's ownership of
liability insurance on the question of W's negligence in manufacturing
widgets. If W noticed that V, a similarly situated,20 7 uninsured widget
manufacturer, was held liable less frequently than W, or was held liable
for lesser damages per capita than Win comparable cases, W might aban-
Id. The implications in subjective probability theory of allowing a defendant to prove
his good character as a defense, which would alter the jury's regret matrix in a different
way, is a question which Professor Lempert does not address and which will accordingly
be reserved for a later time. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); note 126 & accompanying
text supra. Professor Bartels argues that jurors should be informed of the degree of punish-
ment to which the accused, if found guilty, could be subjected, on the theory that the jury
should and will increase the burden of proof in a criminal case as the possible punishment
increases. Bartels, supra note 86. Without otherwise discussing the merits of Professor
Bartels' argument, it poses an interesting problem when the accused's prior convictions
are relevant to the length of the accused's possible sentence. If the jury is to be informed
of the length of time this particular accused would serve if convicted, then, on Bartels'
reasoning, the burden of proof to convict a defendant with a record of criminal convictions
is greater than the burden to convict a defendant without a prior criminal record. On the
other hand, if the jury is to be informed of only the standard sentence for a criminal without
a prior record, then there is some degree of contradiction of Professor Bartels' argument
that the reasonable doubt standard must be more stringent as the punishment involved
becomes more severe, id. at 907.
11 A modified form of Professor Lempert's argument worked well for this author in
teaching evidence at the University of Miami in 1979-1980. Students several times stated
that a regret model, coupled with considerations addressed ii the succeeding text, made
the distinction between "logical" and "legal" relevance clearer.
Although the regret analysis does not consider macro-disutility, the undesired results
discussed in the text would not arise under the regret analysis because under this analysis
evidence of liability insurance, see text at note 200 supra, and evidence of past crimes,
see text at note 204 supra, should be excluded.
That is, with identical or nearly identical quality control, raw materials, etc.
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don insurance. In order for W's insurer to stay in business it must receive
from W all it pays out in liability claims, the insurer's costs, and a com-
petitive profit. W would thus pay more in damages than V if W is in-
sured. W would also pay his insurer's cost. This would be a substantial
disincentive to insure. Yet the reason for encouraging insurance may be
to make the prospect of compensation to victims more secure."8
Similarly, admissibility of past crimes may have undesirable effects
beyond the effect in the particular case. To the extent a person, once
convicted of a crime, may be convicted on later occasions on the basis
of his prior conviction, the person's incentive to reform is reduced. 9 If
a person who has already been convicted of a crime sees himself as likely
to be convicted of a crime in the future regardless of his future conduct,
he may prefer to commit a crime and enjoy the benefits thereof before
the inevitable incarceration.
The regret analysis' failure to consider questions of distributive justice
or macro-disutilities related to the particular rules of evidence is traceable
to Bayesian theory's problem in dealing with utilities of various verdicts.2 0
Although they may be illustrative of various issues in evidence, Bayesian
models are nevertheless suspect on those grounds in which Bayesian fact-
finding analysis is suspect. However, when Bayesian models are used
merely as illustrative pedagogical models, the defects of Bayesian theory
may be mitigated with relatively little difficulty.
CONCLUSION
Bayesian analysis is inadequate as a prescription for rules of factfind-
ing because of defects in its theory of quantification of subjective prob-
abilities, because of unresolvable doubts about the accuracy of Bayesian
calculations on account of their lack of susceptibility to testing, and because
Bayesian methods can result in the masking or confusion of issues of which
incentives, rewards, or penalties the legal system should dispense-
I See notes 80-81 & 87 & accompanying text supra.f. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference
and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1414-18, 1433-42 (1979) (decisions whether
to predict individual behavior and choices of variables on which to predict may involve
conflicts with respect for individual autonomy as a social value). Although the thrust of
Professor Underwood's argument is slightly different from that in the text, her conclusion
is most apposite, when one recalls that a record of prior convictions is, after the individual
has been convicted, largely out of the individual's control. "If... applicants are regarded
as able to change, and especially if certain changes are desirable, then it is preferable
to use nonpredictive criteria of selection that tend to induce those changes by reward and
punishment, or to use predictive methods that base predictions on factors within the in-
dividual's control." Id. at 1448. Another defect in Bayesian theory which one could infer
from Professor Underwood's article is that autonomy is a social value which is not readily
quantifiable and so may not be subject to restatement in a factfinder's "regret matrix."
"I0 See notes 86-87 & accompanying text supra.
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questions of distributive justice. These defects can be profitably compared
to a standard of verification value, derivable from the philosophy of science
and from the evidence rules themselves, which seeks to maximize the
testing of data presented to the factfinder. As a nonquantified standard,
it avoids the problems attendant upon Bayesian quantification and inter-
pretation and does not conceal issues of distributive justice.
Bayesian theory can be useful as an illustration of problems in evidence
law. Bayesian theory used for illustrative modeling, as currently
developed, does have limitations analogous, if not identical, to those of
prescriptive Bayesian factfinding theory; however, these limitations are
controllable when Bayesian theory is used only for illustration or limited
analysis. Rather than use as a means of securing "pseudo-tautological
results" '' by arguing that a desired result is supported because a
mathematical model, based on questionable assumptions, indicates that
result, Bayesian theorists should concentrate on the primary reason for
mathematical models:
Models are, for the most part, caricatures of reality, but if they
are good, like good caricatures, they portray, though perhaps in
distorted manner, some of the features of the real world.
The main role of models is not so much to explain and to predict-
though ultimately these are the main functions of science-as to
polarize thinking and to pose sharp questions.2'12
One would have to conclude, given the volume of scholarly discussion,
that Bayesian evidence theorists have succeeded in posing sharp ques-
tions. A Bayesian prescription of factfinding or the rules of evidence,
however, has too many flaws, both practically and theoretically, to be
much more than an academic curiosity.
I" Comment, Mathematical Models of Legal Rules: Application, Exploitation and Inter-
pretation, 13 CONN. L. REV. 33, 83 (1980).
2" Kac, Some Mathematical Models in Science, 166 Sci. 695, 699 (1969).
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